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The ARYAN PATH

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CONTENTS

	Page
The Great Delusion	1
The World is One: International Economics and Finance—*By Frederick Soddy*	3
The Message of Bodhidharma: Founder of Zen Buddhism—*By Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki*	10
The Home and the State—*By Mary R. Beard*	15
Literature as a Moral Force—	
The Hero in Fiction—*By A. N. Monkhouse*	20
The Return to Decency—*By Humbert Wolfe*	23
The Heresy of Separateness—*By J. D. Beresford*	25
The Ideal Social Order—*By Radhakumud Mookerji*	29
Shakespeare's Dream—*By John Middleton Murry*	34
New Books and Old—	
A Noble Call to Action—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset*	41
Heredity: Some Old Hindu Points of View—*By S. V. Viswanatha and M. A. Venkata Rao*	45
The Futility of Rationalizing—*By Max Plowman*	49
Reviews—*By R. Naga Raja Sarma, Clifford Bax, J. S. Collis, Margaret Smith*	51
Ends & Sayings	55

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THE THEOSOPHICAL MOVEMENT

THIS monthly publication of 16 pages blends the past and the present by reprinting old articles from H. P. B.'s *Theosophist* and *Lucifer*, and W. Q. Judge's *Path*, as well as throwing the light of Theosophy on modern events. All articles are of practical interest.

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Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. VII JANUARY 1936 No. 1

THE GREAT DELUSION

Modern civilization, while claiming to be guided by modern science, puts a premium upon separateness, both of individuals and of their arbitrary groups of creed, class, nation and race.

Science affirms the truth that the world of form and being is an immense chain of which all the links are connected. It is on the track of that homogeneous substance out of which all forms of life are fashioned according to laws inherent in Nature. The march of science is in the direction of Life or Spirit and however alien its terminology, its ideas are nearing the fundamental propositions of the Esoteric Philosophy. When science finally teaches those propositions it will not be proclaiming a discovery but only reaffirming age-old truths. Religious lore retains unmistakable traces of these truths, but they are mixed up and covered over with theological beliefs and superstitions. Religion speaks of the omnipresence of deity as science of the homogeneity of substance, but votaries of both are far from making actual practical applications of their own teachings. Politicians and sociologists constantly assert that all men are brothers—a corollary of the teaching that one deity is in all and that of one substance all are made and moulded. But despite all this mankind is far indeed from acting as it ought to act if those propositions are true.

Thus within each country there is class and caste struggle, hidden or manifest. In some, one element is in the ascendant—the labouring class in Soviet Russia, "socialists" with one programme in Fascist Italy, "socialists" with another in Nazi Germany. In others, a precarious balance is maintained between rival parties, like the Republicans and Democrats in the United States of America, parties which are distinct without being different. Corporations are conducted primarily in the interest of their directors and

48129 v.7 1936

stockholders and only secondarily, if at all, for the common weal. Colonies are administered primarily for the good of the seat of empire, their industries discouraged to keep the markets open for products of the ruling country. Some industries, such as munitions manufacture, which are positively subversive of the public good, are sedulously fostered. Everywhere there is opposition, friction, strife, denial in practice of the brotherhood of man.

Nature forces the unity of mankind upon our notice from time to time. An epidemic is no respecter of the arbitrary lines of wealth or country. The dread scourge of infantile paralysis, for example, visits impartially palace and hut, in this, that and the other land. The prices of farm products lag disproportionately behind those of manufactured goods, and the wheels of factories by the thousand cease to turn. The arbiters of fashion in North America rule out ostrich plumes for ornament and the ostrich farmers of South Africa face ruin. Tariff walls, designed to shut out foreign competition, invite reprisals, and exchange of goods languishes, with dire effects on industry at home. The pit dug for another proves a trap to the digger's own feet.

The plight of mankind as a whole is pitiable. As in the old fable of the war between the body and its members, each limb of the great orphan, humanity, selfishly cares but for itself, while the body, neglected, suffers whether the limbs are at war or at rest. This state of things will change only with acceptance of the implications of the concept of the unity of all life.

To show the importance of this principle of unity we have planned a series of articles under the general caption—"The World Is One." Disregard of human solidarity has caused havoc in the fields of economics and finance, religion and philosophy, science and art; recognition of what is implicit in it would lay the foundations of true reconstruction. In this issue we begin the series with Prof. Soddy's contribution. If we have given economics and finance first place it is not because we consider that department of public service as of primary importance but because we desire to show that even in the "practical" business world the philosophical proposition that "The World is One" holds true. A different and truer philosophy of life, a different and truer appraisement of human history, would change in a short while the policy and programme of bankers and brokers. No form of barter, whether it be among pigmies in the heart of some African forest or among the giants of Wall Street and Threadneedle Street, can flout the Law of Brotherhood and the barterers go unscathed.

THE WORLD IS ONE

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

[**Professor Frederick Soddy** won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1921. He has more lately turned his genius to unravelling the economic tangles of our modern world. He writes us that he is " contemplating action to test the legality of the existing monetary system. Unfortunately, to do this effectively by carrying it to the House of Lords is almost too ruinously expensive for an individual to undertake, but I have always advocated it as the British way of progress and orderly evolution as opposed to revolution." He advocates " more science in government, of the sacred as distinct from the profane variety. "—EDS.]

I have been asked to write an article for a series in THE ARYAN PATH under the general title " The World is One," giving the answer to five specific questions reproduced in italics below. Although my sympathies are very little with any monistic prepossessions whatever, the questions I have been asked I am very happy to answer, as they are concerned with that sphere of life, the economic, about which it is possible to say something that is both new and useful, and in which the consequences of ignorance or interested opposition are in no wise compounded for by any superiority or arrogance in the other self-boasted " higher " aspects of life.

(1) *Is it not true that a few govern the masses in every country through financial manipulations ?*

That countries are governed very largely by financial manipulations in the literal sense of manipulating the quantity of money by its secret and sudden creation and destruction—is, of course, the main conclusion at which I have arrived since my post-War incursions into the problem of world unrest. Neither am I disposed to deny that these manipulations are in the interests of the rich as opposed to those of the poor, or, to give the matter scientific precision, in the interest of those who own rather than those who owe. Still greater scientific precision no doubt would require it to be understood that " the rich " or those who own, are rich chiefly in relation to the deficits of the rest—that what they own is not wealth but debts. The individual ownership of vast wealth in itself, though no doubt in times of scarcity and insufficiency a potent source of conflict and trouble in the body politic, is in these days of material abundance not the source of the world unrest. It is the relative poverty of the many, which makes it possible and profitable under the monetary system for the individual rich *not* to use and expend the wealth they own on their own enjoyment and individual life, but to *lend* it and get the rest of the community into their debt, and so to live instead upon the interest of the debt. One has only to conceive of a State in which every one was well-off in the sense of being amply provided for as regards the physical necessities of life, to conceive of one in which no one was

well-off in the sinister sense that term increasingly has connoted in the modern era. That era has been given many impressionistic and fanciful names by the economists, sociologists and political theorists of the past, without exception with hardly a child's apprehension of its true origin and nature. It has been called "industrialism," "capitalism," the "machine-age" and the like, with all the accompanying personification of its protagonists in the guise of devils and bedevilled, dear to the melodrama. But science, the origin of the vast and catastrophic changes in the life of men and in the mode by which they wring their sustenance from Nature, is still apparently outside the mental horizons of academic sociologists. To them it is a useful milch-cow and drudge, with a position no doubt of some consequence in the servants' hall, rather than the real agent moulding the civilisations of men.

It is possible to get a simple view of what has been and is taking place. By the control over the inanimate sources of power in nature, and its ability to harness these to do the work of the world, science has simply by-passed men altogether in many of the customary avenues by which formerly they were enabled to derive a livelihood. It can provide for more by the employment of fewer. So far as physical possibility is concerned the age-long struggle of men against poverty is finally won, and the population of the world could be secure from the fear of acute physical want, and its consequences in limiting the number of people who can survive, which up to now has been one of the major factors in the world's history.

But this power over nature, this ability to supply *a revenue* of the real wealth that maintains life, has nothing to do with the *amassing* of riches. It controls nature by understanding her laws, not by defying them and attempting to alter them, and one of the laws of nature is that wealth *rots*. Hence, alongside of this enormous increase in the sustaining power of the planet, has gone a parallel development of financial manipulation and jugglery, which has made it possible to amass *debts*. So far as the individual goes, a debt, that is of course the ownership of a debt, is the handiest and most "fluid" form of "wealth." Such, for example, is money, a national or communal debt, repayable on demand by exchange *for* wealth (not change *into* wealth) with some other member of the community in which it is legal tender.

Better still, a debt does not rot with the passage of time. On the contrary, if the owner does not want immediate repayment, he can charge interest on it, but in these days only so far as there may exist in the world a class of poor debtors to borrow from him. Usury is as ancient as history, but till science released wealth somewhat more open-handedly than the titular deities who heretofore had got the credit for its creation, this particular problem of maintaining poverty in the teeth of abundance for the benefit of the creditor, and to maintain the due rate of interest, had never arisen. Clearly it defies solution—in that form.

So one returns to the question wondering about those "few rich." Would it not be truer to say that the government of the masses by tricky financial manipulation is possible because of the desire of the poor to become "rich." To the unsophisticated that may mean merely to have enough and to spare of the things on which to live, a perfectly possible and innocuous, indeed an essential aspiration, if the scientific civilisation is to find peace. But how many actually are unsophisticated? Philosophers and people, possibly, immersed in similar entirely absorbing pursuits or hobbies, asking only, like the yogi, that his milk may be left regularly at the door by an adoring populace, that he may have time to concentrate on the higher aspects of existence. For those less aloof, riches conjure up the dream of "power over the lives and labour of others," as Ruskin curiously defined wealth rather than debt, even though the aspiration extend no further than getting in a drudge to do the heavier part of the housework (or a secretary to do this sort of thing).

But in the main, my answer to Question (1) must be in the affirmative. For without financial manipulation,—and that means the substitution, in peoples' whole mental attitudes, of the idea of the ownership of a debt as, for the *individual*, equivalent to ownership of wealth, the masses could not be governed for one week as they are governed. Unfortunately this substitution of debt for wealth applies only to an individual. Its communal extension is absurd. No one but a professional economist could solemnly contemplate a millennium arriving through all becoming so rich that all could live at ease ever after on their mutual interindebtedness!

(2) *If so, what is the remedy?*

If the foregoing argument is followed, the first step in the remedy leaps to the eye, but what is not so obvious is that it is the first step that counts, and that no others may be necessary.

The remedy is the enforcement of the universal world laws against counterfeiting or the private uttering of money in fact. This now is merely the pious belief of an ignorant and deluded mob who think that the law is protecting them from people producing new money at will, like conjurors producing rabbits out of a hat, and, what is far worse, as mysteriously causing it to disappear again. This is an accurate description of democracy as at present led, except perhaps in America where the Broadcast and Press have not yet been got under "proper control." The remedy is that it shall be true again in reality. The uttering and destruction of money should be the monopoly of the State in which that money is legal tender, the citizens of which implement the debt in wealth (which money is) by accepting it in payment for wealth. The public for the most part still think of money as tangible coins or paper notes, but the financial jugglery, by which the world has been tricked and is kept poor in the midst of plenty for the benefit of the creditor or wealthy class, depends essentially on a kind of money that has no physical existence. It is called

"bank-credit," and is a debt of money owed to the owner by a bank, which in turn is owed by a borrower *who has spent it.* It comes into existence every time a bank extends a loan to a borrower and it is decreated out of existence every time the borrower repays the debt. Though it has no *physical* existence like a paper note* or coin, apart from being merely an entry or rather pair of entries in a bank's books, on the one hand signifying what the bank owes a depositor, and on the other what it is owed by a borrower, that does not make the least difference in practice between the one kind of money and the other. The one is a debt acknowledged by the issue of a paper or metal receipt. The other is a debt created without any tangible acknowledgment. What the banks really do when they extend a loan to an impecunious customer, without any owner of money giving up what is supposed to have been lent, is to create that sum of new money, as every tyro in the subject now knows. The community which before was under obligation to supply wealth on demand to the owners of money are now under obligation to supply more by the amount of the "loan." The person who has been granted the loan gets, for nothing whatever from the community, the wealth equivalent to the money loaned. This is contrary to the principle of money, which enabled the device successfully to replace barter and the older forms of feudalism and communism. That principle is that the person offering the money has himself in an earlier transaction given up the equivalent of goods or services in order to obtain it, *i. e.*, that it is a receipt for "Value Received" before it is a "Promise to Pay" it back. But this is not its worst or most antisocial feature. The borrowers as a class are put in permanent and inescapable bondage to the issuer of money, because once this system is instituted *their debts can never afterwards be repaid.* The physical tokens, the coins or paper notes in the whole country would only pay a few per cent of the debts in money they owe the banks and the banks owe their depositors. Every debt repaid to a bank destroys that sum of money, and as soon as prosperity begins and the borrowers start paying their debts to the bank, they destroy the means of payment and precipitate a crisis by the disappearance from the community of the medium of exchange, so that business can no longer be carried on. Having converted all economic transactions from barter and the like into what are essentially exchanges of goods for money, the monetary system makes it difficult almost to impossibility to reinstitute barter when prosperity comes and enables the trading community to repay some of its debts, thus destroying the very money upon which the economic life of nations now entirely depends. Whereas the repayment of a *genuine* loan of money leaves its quantity unaltered; all that happens is that B then has what A had.

*In origin the paper note was a receipt for gold received and a promise to repay it on demand.

For the rest this bank trickery is best described to the ordinary man as a way, difficult to detect, of juggling with all the standards of measure and weight at once, and of making the pound, the yard and the gallon shrink by extending "bank credit" and swell by recalling it. For the yard, pound and gallon in their economic significance have reference only to the price paid for these quantities of commodities, and by increasing the amount of money uttered so that each unit is worth less, the effect is physically identical with decreasing to the same extent the measure of the yard, the pound or the gallon. It is by tricks of this order that simple people are kept like Sisyphus always toiling at rolling stones up hills only to see them come tumbling down again and are lucky if they escape with their bare lives.

The remedy then is to restore the prerogative of the Crown with regard to all forms of money, and to prevent impecunious parties being supplied with money by private concerns without anyone giving up the ownership of it, and conversely to stop its destruction when people repay their debts. The principles that should be observed are in reality as simple as those by which the standards of weights and measures are enforced. The quantity of money should be increased or decreased in accordance with the findings of a statistical bureau as required to keep the price-index of commodities constant, being increased when the latter tends to fall and decreased when it tends to rise. Money should be regarded by people as a form of national debt, the proceeds of its issue as a direct levy on the community's wealth analogous to the money levies known as taxation, and conversely the cost of its destruction, if ever necessary, would be defrayed out of the common taxes. That is, the proceeds (about nine millions a year on the average for the past two centuries) should go to the relief of the taxpayer.

As for the existing situation, it should be met by requiring banks to hold £ for £ of national money against their debts to current-account depositors who use cheques instead of cash. The debts of the trading community to the banks should be transferred to the State, who in return for the collateral security of the debtors would issue to the banks the national money required for their solvency according to the new £ for £ requirement stated. When the debtors repay their debts and recover their collateral security, the money should be spent to buy on the open market the equivalent of interest-bearing national debt securities, which would be destroyed. The taxpayer would be thus relieved of the burden of payment on them, in this country a cool hundred millions of pounds annually. The money so being returned to circulation, the community could then get out of debt through prosperity instead of being bankrupted by it.

It will probably pass the bounds of belief of the ordinary man in the street, either that the world's unrest can have such a simple explanation as a defective money system, or that the proposals to reform it here outlined are *all* that are really required without any of the nasty nostrums

of the windy political fraternity. These reforms were put forward originally in a book "Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt" by the writer in 1926. A scheme, identical in every respect except that he claims the banks should be compensated whereas I hold they are rather in need of indemnification, has been put forward as his own by one of the leading American economists, Irving Fisher, this year under the title "100% Money." So the man in the street may form his own conclusion from the steady growth of this subject of money reform in the political consciousness. But if it is a help to him to understand why the measures proposed would be electrical in their effect in restoring the world to sanity, he should, if his memory goes back so far, think of the War and of the effect of the inflation when the monetary strangle hold on industry was released. He should then eliminate from that picture both the War and the rise of prices that then ensued. Money is the distributive mechanism of Society, and if it were protected from being tampered with, as weights and measures are, no power on earth could prevent the distribution for use and consumption of all the community is able and willing to produce as well in Peace as in War. Think what that means. Is it not all a man of sense could ask? Whereas if the world is left longer at the mercy of the time-serving politician, watching like a cat that no one gets anything except his precious paupers as a "gift" from his august benevolence—though even a fool should know by now that the only thing a politician can give is more taxation—the mounting tide of wealth will burst its barrier again as it did before in world war and destruction.

These two answers already cover much in the three remaining questions in principle, and they can only be dealt with quite briefly.

(3) *Is it true that the high standard of physical living in the West is sustained by exploiting the masses of the Orient, which factor keeps the standard of living low in the East?*

I should rather put it that the supply of credit-worthy borrowers in the West having proved insufficient for the conversion into debt of the revenue of wealth capable of being produced by science, the West has turned to the East to find new borrowers. To me the East is now undergoing an almost precise repetition of the course of affairs in the West in the early days of the development of science and of "banking." This would have been totally impossible if the money system had been honest, and my advice to the East therefore is to cultivate the blessings of science but to look to its banking system.

It is of course true that some of the present high standard of living in the West is at the expense of the exploitation of the raw materials of tropical countries. But this is a mere phase. Were those sources of supply cut off, the same science which now finds its outlet in their utilisation would be directed to their substitution or production. In other words, the advance of knowledge over traditional methods and *ad hoc* beliefs transcends geographical and

territorial limitations. Science has reversed the relative positions of Man and Nature, and could, if no tropical countries existed, make even a desert blossom like a garden.

(4) *Is the remedy to transform Eastern countries and to Westernise them?*

(5) *If not, what is to be done?*

I probably agree with the intention of the first question, though not with its form. Science is neither Eastern nor Western. It implies a certain honesty of attitude towards the external world, a readiness to admit ignorance, and a determination to put questions to Nature, *i.e.*, to experiment, to ascertain the truth "though the heavens fall." What some pundit may have thought or said about anything thousands of years ago in some remote backwater in the childhood of the race has in this search no sacrosanctity.*

Once ascertained, the truth is universal, and the same answers would be given to the same questions by men working independently whether in the East or in the West. This sort of truth is of course limited in scope. Indeed, it may be said to be at present practically confined to the economic aspects of life, which is what the five questions are concerned with. But this may require a further remark that the economic environment or framework of life is determinate, and is an independent factor, in the sense that if it is unfavourable life is rendered impossible, or proportionately stunted.

The converse proposition that economic abundance stunts the finer aspects of life has often been advanced but curiously by those who have both experienced it and yet claim to be better than the ruck in poverty! Some biologists might possibly support it or at least admit it as a possible danger. But if we are to believe them, the actual vicissitudes out of which life has reached its present level seem so much more dangerous to its higher aspects than merely having sufficient to eat and drink and so on, that the probability is that any support from the biologists would be very qualified, and confined to those without the imagination to conceive of any system differing as much from that to which they are accustomed as this age differs from a century ago.

FREDERICK SODDY

* Why this gratuitous fling at the ancients, many of whom would rank as Scientists, by Professor Soddy's own definition? Not to go farther back into history, did not a Greek pundit, one Plato, exhibit at least as sound social knowledge as modern theorists of Europe and America have evolved? Modern electric bulbs give a bright light wherever the electric current goes. The ancient and outmoded lanthorn, however throws light in places where modern science does not or cannot penetrate.—EDS.

THE MESSAGE OF BODHIDHARMA

FOUNDER OF ZEN BUDDHISM

[**Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki** is the well-known authority on Mahayana Buddhism. He has to his credit numerous volumes in his chosen field, including an English translation of the *Lankavatara Sutra*, *Introduction to Zen Buddhism*, and *The Training of the Zen Monk*. He and his wife edit *The Eastern Buddhist*.—EDS.]

The history of Zen Buddhism starts with Bodhidharma, popularly known as Daruma in Japan and Tamo in China, who came to China late in the fifth century. But the significance of Daruma was not fully recognised until the time of Yeno (Hui-nêng in Chinese) when a dispute arose between him and his opponent, Jinshū (Shên-hsiu). They were both disciples of Gunin (Hung-jên, died 675), and each claimed to transmit the orthodox line of the Zen teaching traceable to the First Patriarch, Bodhidharma. This being the case, we can say that the value and signification of Zen Buddhism as distinct from all the other schools of Buddhism so far developed in China was not manifestly appreciated by its followers until late in the seventh century.

What is then the teaching of Daruma? Three characteristic features of it may be pointed out as distinguishable from other Buddhist schools. As Daruma's teaching, which later came to be known as Zen Buddhism, belongs to the practical wing of the Mahayana, it does not attempt to offer any novel method of philosophising on the truth of Buddhism. Daruma was no logician. He simply wanted to live the truth. Whatever he taught, therefore, consisted in presenting a method considered by him to be most effective in the attainment of the final goal of the Buddhist life. The characteristic features of his teaching are thus inevitably all related to the Buddhist discipline.

1. The first thing needed for the discipline then was to know definitely what the objective of the Buddhist life was. Without full knowledge of this, the Yogin would be like a blind man running wild. Daruma pointed out that the objective was to see into the nature of one's own being, and this he designated *shin* or *kokoro* (or *hsin* in Chinese). *Shin* or *hsin* corresponds to the Sanskrit *citta* but frequently to *hridaya*. When it is translated as "mind," it is too intellectual; "heart" is too emotional; while "soul" suggests something concrete, it is so strongly associated with an ego-substance. Provisionally I shall make Mind with a capital M perform the office of *shin* or *hsin*. Now Daruma wants us to see into this Mind. For it is only when this is perceived or grasped that we attain the end which is the "peaceful settling of the mind," called *anjin* (*an-hsin*).

Daruma's interview with Eka (Hui-k'ê) is significant in this respect. He did not talk about realising Nirvana, or attaining emancipation; nor did he discourse on the

doctrine of non-ego, that is, *anatta*. When Eka told his master how troubled he was in his mind, the latter at once demanded that he produce this troubled mind before him so that he could calm it for its owner. For this was Daruma's patented method, which had not yet been resorted to by any of his predecessors.

When Eka complained about his mind being in trouble, he used the term "mind" in its conventional meaning, which, however, indicated also that his thought followed the conventional line of reasoning. That is to say, he cherished an unconscious belief in the reality of an entity known as mind or *shin*, and this belief further involved a dualistic interpretation of existence leading to the conceptual reconstruction of experience. As long as such a belief was entertained, one could never realise the end of the Buddhist discipline. Daruma, therefore, wished to liberate Eka from the bondage of the idea of a mind. Liberation was a "pacific settlement" of it, which was at the same time the seeing into the inner nature of one's own being, the Mind.

Eka must have spent many years in this search for a mind, with which he was supposed to be endowed, philosophically or logically as well as conventionally. Finally, it must have dawned upon him that there was after all no such entity as to be known as mind. But this recognition failed to ease his mind, because it still lacked a final "stamping"; it did not break out in his consciousness as a final experience. He appeared again before Daruma and gave an answer to the master's former demand for a mind: "I seek for the mind but it is not attainable." Daruma now exclaimed, "I have your mind peacefully settled!"

Eka now had a real experience, this authoritative "stamping" on the part of the master broke the intellectual barrier and made Eka go beyond the mere formulation of his insight as the unattainability of a mind. Without Daruma's absolute confirmation, Eka did not know yet where to have his "mind" fixed. A fixing was no-fixing, and therefore the fixing, to use the Prajñā dialectic. In other words, Eka found his "mind" where it was not to be found, and thus his "mind" came to be finally peacefully settled. This is Daruma's doctrine of Mind.

2. Did Daruma teach us any definite form of meditation? Zen means *dhyāna, i. e.*, meditation. Being the First Patriarch of Zen in China, Daruma naturally advocates meditation. But his is the one specifically known as Hekkwan (*pi-kuan*), literally "wall-gazing." He has never defined the term and it is difficult to know exactly what kind of meditation it was. This much we can say, that as long as it was differentiated from the traditional method and claimed to be Mahayanistic, it was not mere tranquillisation, nor was it a form of contemplation. It was to follow the idea referred to in the *Vimalakirti*: "When a mind is controlled so as to be steadily fixed on one subject, such an one will accomplish anything." This means "to keep mind as self-concentrated as a rigidly standing cliff, with nothing harassing its imperturbability." For

thereby one can enter the Path (*tao*).

Daruma's Hekkwan, therefore, means "concentration," fixing attention steadily on one subject. But there must have been something more in it. The Hekkwan was the method of finding out the "abode of all thoughts," in other words, of having an insight into the nature of Mind. The method is always defined and controlled by the object. When the object is to experience what is immovable in the movable without stopping its movement, the self-concentration means a state of utmost activity, and not at all mere quietude or passivity. The Hekkwan then in connection with its object begins to have a definite signification of its own.

In fact "wall-gazing" is not at all appropriate to explain the Hekkwan. "To stand rigidly like a cliff" does not mean the bodily posture assumed by the Zen practiser when he sits cross-legged with his backbone straight. "Being like a cliff or wall" refers to an inner state of mind in which all disturbing and entangling chains of ideas are cut asunder. The mind has no hankerings now; there is in it no looking around, no reaching out, no turning aside, no picturing of anything, it is like a solid rock or a block of wood; there is neither life nor death in it, neither memory nor intellection. Although a mind is spoken of according to the conventional parlance, here there is really no "mind," the mind is no-mind, *shin* is *mushin, hsin* is *wu-hsin, citta* is *acitta.* This is the Hekkwan meditation.

But if we imagine this to be the final state of the exercise, we are greatly in the wrong, for we have not yet entered into the Path (*tao*). The necessary orientation has been achieved, but the thing itself is far beyond. When we stop here, Zen loses its life. There must be a turning here, a waking-up, a new state of awareness reached, the breaking of the deadlock, so to speak. All the intellectual attempts hitherto made to seek out the abode of all thoughts and desires could not come to this; all forms of contemplation, all the exercises of tranquillisation hitherto advocated by the Indian and the Chinese predecessors of Daruma could not achieve this. Why? Because the objects they erected severally for their discipline were altogether amiss and had no inherent power of creation in them.

3. What may be called the ethical teaching of Daruma's Zen Buddhism is the doctrine of Mukudoku (*wu-kung-te* in Chinese) which means "no merit." This is the answer given by Daruma to his Imperial inquirer as to the amount of merit to be accumulated by building temples, making offerings to the Buddha, providing shelters for monks and nuns, etc. According to the First Patriarch, deeds performed with any idea of merit accruing from them have no moral value whatever. Unless you act in accord with the "Dharma," which is by nature pure, beyond good and bad, you cannot be said to be a Zen follower.

According to Daruma, there is no antithesis in the Dharma of good and evil, of detachment and attachment, of "self" and "other." In Daruma's discourse on "the Twofold Entrance" he describes the life of a

wise man in the following terms :—

As there is in the essence of the Dharma no desire to possess, a wise man is ever ready to practise charity with his body, life, and property, and he never begrudges, he never knows what an ill grace means. As he has a perfect understanding of the threefold nature of Emptiness (*sūnyatā*), he is above partiality and attachment. Only because of his will to cleanse all beings of their stains, he comes among them as one of them, but he is not attached to form. This is the self-benefiting phase of his life. He, however, knows also how to benefit others, and again how to glorify the truth of enlightenment. As with the virtue of Charity, so with the other five virtues : Morality, Humility, Indefatigability, Meditation, and Intuition. That a wise man practises the six virtues of perfection is to get rid of confused thoughts, and yet there is no consciousness on his part that he is engaged in any meritorious deeds—which means to be in accord with the Dharma.

This concept of meritless deeds is one of the most difficult to understand—much more to practise. When this is thoroughly mastered the Zen discipline is said to have been matured. The first intellectual approach to it is to realise that things of this world are characterised by polarity as they are always to be interpreted in reference to a subject which perceives and values them. We can never escape this polar opposition between subject and object. There is no absolute objective world from which a subject is excluded, nor is there any self-existing subject that has no objective world in any sense standing against it. But unless we escape this fundamental dualism we can never be at ease with ourselves. For dualism means finitude and limitation. This state of things is described by Mahayanists as "attainable." An attainable mind is a finite one, and all the worries, fears, and tribulations we go through are the machination of a finite mind. When this is transcended, we plunge into the Unattainable, and thereby peace of mind is gained. The Unattainable is Mind.

This approach being intellectual it is no more than a conceptual reconstruction of reality. To make it a living fact with blood and nerves, the Unattainable must become attainable, that is, must be experienced, for *anjin* (that is, peaceful settling of the mind) will then for the first time become possible.

In a recently recovered Tunghuang MS., which for various reasons I take to be discourses given by Daruma, the author is strongly against mere understanding according to words. The Dharma, according to him, is not a topic for discourse; the Dharma whose other name is Mind is not a subject of memory, nor of knowledge. When pressed for a positive statement, Daruma gave no reply, remaining silent. Is this not also a kind of meritless deed?

According to a Buddhist historian of the T'ang dynasty (618—907 A.D.) the coming of Daruma in China caused a great stir among the Buddhist scholars as well as among ordinary Buddhists, because of his most emphatically antagonistic attitude towards the latter. The scholars prior to him encouraged the study of the Buddhist literature in the form of śūtras and śāstras; and as the result there was a great deal of philosophical systematisation of

the dogmas and creeds. On the practical disciplinary side, the Buddhists were seriously engaged in meditation exercises, the main object of which was a kind of training in tranquillisation. Daruma opposed this, too ; for his *dhyana* practice had the very high object of attaining to the nature of the Mind itself, and this not by means of learning and scholarship, nor by means of moral deeds, but by means of Prajñā, transcendental wisdom. To open up a new field in the Buddhist life was the mission of Daruma.

When Zen came to be firmly established after Yeno (Hui-nêng), there grew among his followers a question regarding the coming of Daruma to China. The question was asked not for information, but for self-illumination. By this I mean that the question concerns one's own inner life, not necessarily anybody else's coming and going. While apparently Daruma is the subject, in reality he has nothing to do with it, and therefore in all the answers gathered below we notice no personal references whatever to Daruma himself.

In order to see what development characteristic of Zen Buddhism the teaching of Daruma made after the sixth patriarch, Yeno (Hui-nêng), in China, I quote some of the responses made to the question cited above, in which the reader may recognise the working of the Mind variously given expression to :—

Ummon Yen : Do you wish to know the Patriarch (Daruma) ? So saying, he took up his staff, and pointing at the congregation continued : The Patriarch is seen jumping over your heads. Do you wish to know where his eyes are ? Look ahead and do not stumble !

Kisu Sen : How did people fare before the coming of Daruma to China ? Clean poverty was fully enjoyed. How after his coming ? Filthy wealth is the cause of many worries.

Keitoku Sei : How were things before Daruma's coming to China ? Six times six are thirty-six. How after his coming ? Nine times nine are eighty-one.

Gyoku-sen Ren : How were things before Daruma's coming to China ? Clouds envelop the mountain peaks. How after his coming ? Rains fall on the Hsiao and the Hsiang.

Hōun Hon : How was the world before Daruma's coming to China ? The clouds dispersing, the three islets loom out clear. How after his coming ? The rain passing, the flowers in hundreds are freshened up. What difference is there between before and after his coming ? The boatman cleaving the light morning fog goes up the stream, while in the evening he comes down with the sail unfurled over the vapoury waves.

To the question, " What is the meaning of Daruma's coming from the West ? " the following answers are given by various masters :—

Ryūge—" This is the question hardest to crack."

Ryōzan Kwan—" Don't make a random talk."

Fusui Gan—" Each time one thinks of it one's heart breaks."

Shōshu—" A happy event does not go out of the gate while a bad rumour travels a thousand miles."

Dōsan—" I will tell you when the river Do begins to flow upward."

In Zen there is no uniform answer, as far as its apparent meaning is concerned, even to one and the same question and the spirit is absolutely free in the choice of material when it wants to express itself.

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

THE HOME AND THE STATE

[**Mary R. Beard** contributed to our May, 1935, issue a discriminating analysis of "The New Feminism." Her background has prepared her for a broad approach to such a human problem as she writes on here. An American by birth and education, she has had friendly contacts with many industrial workers—natives of Europe, Japan and China. Her numerous works include *On Understanding Women*, a study of women's social rôle as revealed in history, and, written with her husband, *The Rise of American Civilization*.—EDS.]

Though it has been the custom in recent times for professors in Western civilisation to write tomes on the State, with the home left out of account, no such shallow view of the State was possible until the modern democratic age. Solon, for example, among the ancient Greeks, in designing a State, planned it as a congeries of families: the Home existed that the State might exist. The State was to get its revenue from taxes paid by the family units; to supply this revenue, families were to keep their property intact, not allowing it to be frittered away on pleasure or diverted to courtesans; in order to keep the family property intact, strict conduct was to be observed by the wife for the purpose of determining heirs and so regularising the transmission of property; in return for her fidelity to her husband, she was to receive protection and support for herself and her children. The Home was the foundation and an integral part of the State. However, in the heyday of a State so conceived, the more aggressive families, ambitious to dominate the State, were battling so fiercely for power that the State was menaced either with dissolution or control by some single family. In our own times we have seen how the Hapsburgs, the Romanoffs, the Bourbons, the House of Savoy, the Bonapartes, out of such strife became States in fact. Ensnared in such contentions, Plato the philosopher turned his thought toward Utopia. In the State which he planned idealistically, family ambition was to be prevented by removing the economic basis of the Home. This was to be done through communism. With the economic foundation of family pride and ambition removed, it was presumed that the guardians of society would be one in spirit and desire—in short, altruistic. Since formal marriage would no longer be necessary, free love would supplant contractual wedlock. Of course the children were wards of the State. The State thus set on the path of law and order and dedicated to peace rested on an agricultural economy.

His philosophic successor, Aristotle, celebrated through long ensuing centuries as the "master of them that know," like his own master, Plato, was concerned with the relation between Home and State. But where each came out with his conclusion depended of course on his interpretation of history, on what he thought was actually taking place in the world,

and on his conception of the good life. Aristotle belonged to an expansive era—to an age turning to wide commercial and political adventuring, to a period of time allowing more scope for the restless and the ambitious, to a quest for power through the agency of the State. In excessive unity, Aristotle saw the defeat of "grand" designs. He regarded private property as sound political science. In the Home he found needed social restraints.

While political science among the ancients often emphasized the rôle of the family in economic affairs and described the social nexus in terms of property, ethical considerations were sometimes set forth as if higher virtues rather stood alone as justifications for the family. Thus Confucius, the great teacher of China, maintained that the sharing of domestic burdens, the discipline which this required, and the loyalty of individuals to the family group were the private virtues essential to virtue on a public stage. And, taking his political science from the Chinese sage, a Japanese shogun in the seventeenth century in fact strengthened the State—public virtue—by tightening family behaviour and "honour."

But a sharp departure was made from all such notions of political science and ethical properties in the eighteenth century, in the Western world. Then and there an idea was formulated which developed into the doctrine, widely entertained, that men and women out of the rigidly disciplined families which States in general had by law erected were competent to break through the cordon of clan regimentation, throw off the authority of Home and State with equal insouciance, "stand on their own feet" as "sovereigns" and demonstrate the worth of the individual. "Birth," nurture, aristocracy, dynasty, were discarded as outworn social virtues. All men, whatever their inheritance, were to stand free and equal before the law like distinct and separate atoms. And in the nineteenth century this idea of progress was feminized. Women too were now atoms. Adults were now all ready to vote and hold office, to own and use property according to their wilful tastes, to be taxed, if at all, as individuals, not in groups as clans. The political Church was brushed aside with the authoritative family and State. The word "subject" was superseded by the word "citizen." Reversing traditional allegiances, the State was now to be subordinate to the individual. Its power was reduced to restrain its tyranny. Man and woman did not exist for the State. The State existed for the man and the woman. For submission and self-abnegation were substituted aggression and positivistic belief in self.

"The less government the better," domestically, religiously, politically, became the creed of the new school of thinkers and activists. "Personality" was prized above all else. Initiative, careering, the spirit of independence, visible and immediate rewards, indomitability rather than sensitive concessions or restraints, the claims of one's own nature, "rights" and not duties, "catch-as-catch-can" ran current as slogans

for the good life and labour. "Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost" became philosophy supreme setting new patterns for political science.

And so the devil took the hindmost. And when the catch was counted, it was discovered that in the dragnet were some twelve to twenty million Americans alone, to say nothing of all the Old-World prey. That this should be the outcome of individualistic enterprise in the New World was particularly startling, owing to the confidence that had been asserted in the power of self-reliance and to the fact that self-reliance had been exercised on a vast continent of virgin soil, endowed with fabulously rich resources, populated by persons physically strong and mentally imaginative, under a machine technology of their devising capable of producing such an abundance of material goods—food, clothing, shelter—as mankind at large had never known. Yet in such an arena as this, homeless, toolless, landless men and women by the million had been set adrift by the collapse of business organisation to forage for the satisfaction of their basic needs and with scant success. That a large section of the human stock in such a region should, in a swift revolution of the clock, be on the verge of starvation came as an awful shock to the thinkers of the individualistic school, though they had been warned a century before that this would happen. The terrors of repressive Home and State had been escaped. But what Winwood Read called the "martyrdom of man"—the phenomenon of the ages—was nevertheless still the order of the day, to all appearances.

In other historic times it had been the habit of the devil when a great catch had been made to employ hapless human beings in the servitudes of war, prostitution and slavery. What would happen now? Would history repeat itself? These were questions which pressed to the fore in Western speech and in the press of the West. Even some of the professorial political scientists now remembered that a social nexus is vital to social stability. To the severing of domestic ties and the lack of nurture by the hearth was traced in large measure the great outburst of crime—the kidnapping, the highway and bank robbing, the murdering. Youth especially was out on a rampage—sowing wild oats. No thoughtful person denied that unless war, prostitution, or slavery in some form—singly or in combination—was once more to gather up the nomads and the destitute, some creative substitute would have to be found—and quickly. How far then did the Home enter into the figuring of the newest political science? The truth is that such figuring is the hardest kind that democracy has to do. For not only has individualism in practice developed a love of liberty but the defeat of household industry by machine industry makes it perfectly clear that, despite the best intentions, untold millions of women must stand like Mother Hubbards at empty cupboards if they try to resume the responsibilities of a Home.

Faced with poverty in this contemporary world-wide economic crisis,

statecraft has tried to solve the riddle of the universe in various ways. Thus in Germany where democracy had a brief fling after the World War, soldiers took possession of the State and drew the Home into their statecraft as the servant of Might. Marriages were planned and celebrated wholesale under the ægis of the State. Grooms generally wore uniforms. For them the wedding bell was a bugle call. For the bride the hearth became the nursery of the Army. In this totalitarian State, boys and girls almost as soon as they have cut their first teeth are commandeered for military discipline so that a completely militarized society may attain the topmost notch of perfectibility. Marching husbands meanwhile exult in the Männerbund which keeps the sex hard for war. Even religion falls under statecraft so conceived and is revised to harmonize with Might as the perfect good. Only in the homes of the Jews driven back to the shadows of the Ghetto, shoved out of the army and politics, may the civilising influences of domesticity last through the years of adolescence. Only from such isolated homes which formerly gave to Germany, out of the Ghetto, her creative Mendelssohns—philosophers, musicians, and artists—may Germany eventually draw healing for her sadistic urge. It is true that all the diverse sects within the dominant and domineering race have not yet yielded up their spiritual values to the single value of force, but they may not be able to withstand the power of arms.

Making no point of internecine racial clashes, Italy accomplishes instant success with statecraft in this mood. Her warriors meet, it seems, no religious dissent. The Vatican may disapprove the course of events but Italy is solidly Catholic. The issue is one of policy rather than of faith. Women can thus be militarized with greater ease. Not even in a Ghetto may domestic virtues come to flower in Italy if the State so conceived keeps its control of the reins. The Home may be the Servant of the Army to the highest possible degree.

But Russia on the other hand has attempted a humanistic statecraft wholly rationalistic in conception. There it is the intention to make the State the "dictator of the proletariat" in the interest of the masses. Russian revolutionary effort and diplomacy have been bent toward the peaceful pursuit of industry within Russia, despite the insistence of some intransigents that world revolution in the interest of world humanism be fomented without delay, before Russia settles down to put her own society in order on this line. In this scheme of political science, while the State is to serve the citizen, the citizen is to give his full devotion to the State which guards his interests. There is to be the utmost co-operation and loyalty. Private property rights are here reduced to the minimum, family ambitions which might divert loyalty from the State are checked in a Platonist fashion, divorce is free and equal, women perform public work on a broad scale, children are nurtured by the State to make up for the weakened Home. But already the increase of waifs in a

young State so designed has thrown burdens upon that State which were originally left out of romantic calculations. What is more, war clouds on the horizon, blown from neighbouring States designed for Might alone, bring to the attention of idealists the serious realistic problem of defence. The emergence of talk about the birth rate in Russia, while the number of waifs mounts, suggests the possibility that the Home in Russia may have to be reinforced to nourish a Red Army. If so, the humanistic statecraft of contemporary Russia will change like the Home.

As democrats in America, up to this moment at any rate more aloof from the upward and outward thrusts of a maddened soldiery, survey these varied foreign schemes of politics and domesticity, what guidance may they derive for the solution of their problem? They have acted without delay to gather roving young people into State-financed work camps. They have appropriated poor relief for families in distress. But these are palliatives merely for a population unemployed. If peace could be the American fortune, if the democrats could have enough time, conceivably they might work out on their broad and richly-endowed continent, guarded from Old-World quarrels by two high seas, some form of opportunity for the individual and security for domestic life which would be creative statecraft. The long martyrdom of mankind to Home and State might be relieved in large measure at any rate. But much surely depends on the American woman, who has enjoyed extraordinary liberty. What is now her concept of the State and of the Home within it? Will she assert the feminine cultural values, including the value of civilisation itself which woman launched at the hearth fire of the world's Eves? Or can she too be so militarized or so drawn into some quest for dynastic power that her own peculiar culture will become bankrupt? This she is discussing in her numerous organisations. She is seeking a political science for herself.

MARY R. BEARD

Do your duty as a son and as a brother, and these qualities will make themselves felt in the government. This, then, really amounts to taking part in the government. Holding office need not be considered essential.

—*Confucius.*

LITERATURE AS A MORAL FORCE

[That novelists cannot evade responsibility for the effect of their writings upon the moral standards of the community is brought out by **Allan N. Monkhouse**, himself a novelist and dramatist of parts, in addition to his many years' service with *The Manchester Guardian*. In connection with this incontestible thesis, the article which follows, written by **Humbert Wolfe**, Principal Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and versatile writer, strikes a reassuring note of hope for our troubled times.—EDS.]

I—THE HERO IN FICTION

We speak of the hero of a novel but the word becomes a convention or even an irony; heroism is not demanded of the hero. This was not always so, and there have been many heroes who might serve for imitation or for inspiration. There is yet, doubtless, a great output of didactic fiction though it rarely approaches the first rank. Our Parish Magazines and their like point the way to a virtuous life, and possibly they have some effect on quiet souls who tread the beaten path. Generally they lack what may be called spiritual adventure, and their readers who emerge into the great world of literature find themselves disconcerted by the absence of old romantic or moral formulas; it is a formidable world in which action is directed rather by the inner impulse than by authority which demands pious obedience. The goody-goody books must give way to those which have disturbing reference to serious experience of life.

Fiction to-day has gone far toward disclaiming moral responsibility. The novelist writes, as we say, to express himself, and he has great respect for what is called the stream of consciousness: the outpouring of the active, untutored mind. Perhaps we might all agree that no man should publish what is to his own advantage if reason tells him that it is against the common cause of humanity. Few could realise themselves in such a position; the conscious evil-doer of melodrama has given way to the loose liver who may regard himself as the herald of freedom.

The advance of democracy has evoked interest in the doings of those who have hitherto played little part in fiction. This is even more marked in the United States than in Great Britain. From the gangster upward attention has been turned to those who had not usually figured in what might be called the literary façade. It may be said that in democratic literature the interest is rarely moral except in so far as it is social or political. The reply to that may be that the social and political have no meaning without morals. But generally we are not called upon to admire; the hero is the type rather than the notability.

We are all apt to imitate, and

the youth, before he settles into the rut, turns naturally to the propagandist or to the record-breaker. He would impersonate, and I may recall how, in early boyhood, the parts of "The Last of the Mohicans" were distributed among young readers. I was fobbed off with Chingachgook but my elder brother secured Hawk-eye and this, to an unusual and even comical degree, stimulated his habit of observation. When a ball was lost there was a cry—perhaps a little ironical sometimes—for Hawk-eye, who would subject the circumstances to an intensive study. He would proceed in terms of detective formula to corner the obvious, and really, it seemed that he was frequently successful. To Fenimore Cooper succeeded Conan Doyle. How many boys have been affected in habit or even in character by an admiring impersonation of Sherlock Holmes?

Or, again, how many youthful pessimists have modified their scheme of life by the example of Mark Tapley? A philosophy of cheerfulness in adversity may do practical good in the world, and Dickens struck a resounding blow on behalf of sanity. Perhaps he overdid it a little but a glorious exaggeration was part of Dickens's genius. It is well to remember that mood must bear some relation to circumstance; joviality is not acceptable at a funeral. I recall an occasion, many years ago, when an old man, stricken by the loss of his wife, assumed a terrible heartiness; he clapped his guests on the back, shouted encouragement; interpreting fortitude in terms of geniality.

Imitation, like everything else, calls for discretion. Perhaps the conscious imitation of a character in a book or in life can hardly bring a successful issue. It would take us beyond our theme to suggest an ideal in the imitation of Christ.

The great novelists do not give us many heroes to imitate. It would not be to the point to imitate David Copperfield or even Thackeray's Dobbin; a boy might store up the idea of Colonel Newcome for future use; Scott should yield a few heroes but he is out of fashion. The Brontës? One shudders at the thought of an imitation of Heathcliffe or of Rochester. George Eliot can supply her Dorothea, her Adam Bede, but they will hardly excite the young people of to-day. Bennett and Wells can produce good fellows but they are not quite stimulating to the budding idealist. There was once a book called "John Halifax, Gentleman," but one cannot remember much about it.

Fielding gave a picture at large of the average man in Tom Jones, but this is not exactly a figure for imitation. Modern youth in search of a hero might try what he can make of Meredith's Beauchamp. To me there is no finer hero, but I dare say that our young hedonists would call him a prig, while those who rejoice in extreme Leftness might scorn him as merely Liberal; something of the historical sense is needed. "Beauchamp's Career" is one of the great political novels;

it is a historical record of the beginning of the aristocratic revolt against aristocracy. It is far more than that; the adventure of a hero of Meredith becomes an ordeal. There is pity and humanity in it; and, astonishingly, there is humour.

Can Shakespeare give us the acceptable, dauntless hero? Such great damaged figures as Antony and Macbeth may at least supply youth with something of mouthing and posing. Shakespeare's heroes might spout good didacticism on occasion but, commonly, they are not strict observers of the moral limits. Propagandist literature has its place in the world but the constructive writer is not a formal teacher. For him to write sanely of the world is to contribute to its evolution. Revolt may be the beginning of wisdom; it may be the spiritual adventure in an ordered world.

Perhaps fiction may sometimes do more for us in warning than in incitement. There is now a great deal of loose fiction which is little concerned with manners and less with morals. Reprobation, admonition may have their effect but they sometimes overshoot the mark. We are not likely to imitate Uriah Heep, and Dickens might have come nearer to our conscience with more subtlety. The great objective villain has not much moral—or immoral—effect; the schoolboy may declaim the speeches of Richard III without tainting his soul; and if youth ever penetrates Thackeray as far as Berry Lyndon it will not do him much harm. Our schoolboy may, indeed, approach tragedy through the ranting villain; he has, too, a respect for wiliness and the slow bowler becomes a fascinating figure.

There is much admirable literature available for children, and perhaps the want is rather for the adolescent. We do not wish to return to the consciously instructive, to the principle of "Sandford of Merton," but youth may continue to aspire to that difficult, fascinating ideal whose service is perfect freedom. We cannot all rely, as Wordsworth says, "upon the genial sense of youth." We are affected, and in youth often deeply affected, by characters in fiction. It would appear that responsibility is thrown upon the novelists; this is a world in which it is impossible to escape from responsibility. The artist cannot stop continually to ask himself whether he is doing his best for the human race; he must make strange and precarious excursions; but he is not a good citizen of the world if he does not think of his comrades in it. Our fiction is influential; too much of it is irresponsible; the revolt against limitations may have helpful elements but even sanity is a limitation.

The novelist has no need to avoid morals; rather, they are his greatest asset. The work of art may be saturated with its moral, as in the case of Sir Willoughby Patterne. Fiction has been ruled by individuals but its scope is wide and it cannot evade the major movements, social or spiritual, of

its time. It must do something toward realising a democratic ideal in the preservation of what is best in aristocracy. It must be, as C. E. Montague said of John Galsworthy, " passionate on both sides."

A. N. MONKHOUSE

II.—THE RETURN TO DECENCY

The essence of art is the imposition of order on what is by its nature disordered. It needs no acquaintance with metaphysics to realize that until the mind has absorbed and rearranged matter no form of creation has taken place. In the beginning, in the lovely legendary metaphor, there was the waste of objectivity till the mind of God—the first and greatest Author—gave it the order of His thought.

This is dull platitude. But in times of temporal danger men fly to the barricades, and in times of spiritual to platitudes, which have endured assault and outlived it. For this particular, and ultimate, definition of art has been, and is still being, hotly denied in theory and in practice in all ranges of creative activity and in most countries, not least in the Anglo-Saxon world. Perhaps rightly tired of the old order, which led in 1914 to the destruction of the world, the post-war youths have sought not for a new order, but for the elevation of disorder and the triumph of the Surd. It has been solemnly argued, not least by those unacquainted with the elementary rules of logic, that the day of the Subject is over. It is the Hour of the Object—and it must be freely admitted that much of the work put out justifies the noun. It is held that the mind is, in a sense, an impertinent intruder, blurring the fresh tones of outside fact by its sentimental veilings. What is required, urge these thinkers, is to allow its individuality to the smallest stone—to say to that object, " If you are blameless, be the first to cast yourself." To Impressionism and Post-Impressionism succeeds the school of Sur-Realism—which may be translated as Refusal of All-Impressionism. In other words, for the folly of Art for Art's sake is substituted the crime of No Art for No Art's sake.

The immediate consequences of this revolution have been startling as to both the form and the substance of all branches of Art. In painting the non-representational has produced circles swooning in the rapture of having failed to achieve the squares with which they are surrounded. In sculpture a cloud as large as the hand of Epstein's " Rima " has obscured the sky. In Music the factory hooter calls to his mate, like the satyr crying to his fellow. In prose Messrs. Hemingway and Faulkner have given language all the charm and some of the difficulty of a cross-word puzzle—without the clues. In poetry everything is permitted except rhyme, scansion, rhythm and meaning.

But, when the austerities of form are abandoned, all is abandoned. There can be nothing to choose between a " gondola " and " eczema," if the mind is not allowed its inter-

ventions. With the consequence that "eczema," as being the more noticeable and the less frequently recorded in literature, is the likelier survivor. And so with a bound, aided by the strange conclusions of psycho-analysis, literature has fastened on every variety of sexual misadventure as the ensign of "The Return to the Object." This needs no proof. "A daring novel" as an aging contemporary observed, "would be an account of persons living in open wedlock. Fortunately no publisher could be found to lend his name to such an outrage." In consequence the printing-presses wearily grind out millions of words faithfully reproducing the outcries (say) of a girl of fifteen hopelessly in love with the third waistcoat-button of a dead film-star.

But a doom is creeping upon this world of sexual concentration. The public—poor, stupid, deluded and timid multitude—are becoming bored. It was fun for a time to be all rogues and Sadists together. But the novelty of being universally sex-conscious wore off. After all, there must be a moment or two in the day when the man in the street must think of other things than the painstaking geography of his entrails. It was, therefore, with a shout of relief that the wider world welcomed in turn "The Good Companions," "Magnolia Street" and "The Fountain." The excessive enthusiasm with which these three works were greeted, was not necessarily, or indeed chiefly, a tribute to their literary qualities. It was rather a repetition of that high shout in Chesterton's poem :—

> We have seen the city of Mansoul, even as it rocked, relieved.

It is true, of course, that examples of the School of Denial are still constantly exalted by the critics of the day. It is equally true that the public are still browbeaten into buying such stuff as "Anthony Adverse" in large quantities. As it is equally true that in the world of politics we are living through a time in which the spirit of evil seems increasingly in the ascendant. Nevertheless, in the long view there is reason to hope that the tide is, if only by painful inches, turning. No new gods comparable to Bennett or Galsworthy have arisen, despite frantic efforts to elevate various transatlantic scribes to that position. Of the younger writers only those in the tradition have made a wide advance. J. B. Priestley is no Dickens and Charles Morgan no Meredith, but at least they are honest workmen, who face, and often overcome, the incredible difficulties of creation.

But beyond and behind this are the inalienable facts. Thought alone creates. Its object is still to evolve order. To deny this is to deny the structure of life and of the intellect. Like all attempts to build towers of Babel or to pile Pelion upon Ossa, it carries its doom within itself. It is a self-contradiction, and its doctrine is one of prolonged suicide. But suicide is after all not a continuous process. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*

HUMBERT WOLFE

THE HERESY OF SEPARATENESS

[In this article **J. D. Beresford** draws, out of his own experience, suggestions as to how to overcome the " great dire heresy " that separates man from his fellow men.—EDS.]

If through the Hall of Wisdom, thou would'st reach the Vale of Bliss, Disciple, close fast thy senses against the great dire heresy of Separateness.

At the moment of writing this quotation from *The Voice of the Silence*, the whole world, as represented by its Rulers, its Statesmen, its vocal public and its Press, is preaching and practising this "dire heresy of Separateness." In every country of Europe, in America and the Far East, we see men and women drawing together in a common cause but that cause is, without exception, an ideal of Nationalism. Men unite and find agreement among themselves only to serve their personal ends in the name of the nation. In Germany, to quote a single example, " the brotherhood of blood," the claim to be of one family, is to be used for the furtherance of an ambition that must completely disregard the interests and welfare of all other families of different blood. In Nationalism we see the Egotism of the individual exhibited on an enlarged scale. Behind it lies the self-seeking of those whose interests will be served by racial alliances against the common enemy. Nietzsche spoke of the Christian ethic as a " slave morality." In precisely the same sense, Nationalism may be described as slave immorality, the practice of evil under the shelter of the mass, which is a defence for the feebleness of the unit.

Moreover no church that has ever preached the commandment of Christ, that we love one another, has yet been able to avoid that heresy of Separateness, so clearly condemned by the great fundamental tenet of Theosophy. The reason for this can be deduced at once from the Nietzschean criticism just quoted. The vice of Nationalism is inherent in the teaching of the Christian Churches. The individual avoids personal responsibility by alliance with the mass; and his personal vanity, his intolerance and his hatreds may all find vent in being directed against a creed regarded as heterodox, even though such a creed be derived from the teachings of the same Master he professes to serve.

The reverse of slave morality is individualism, though not of the kind advocated by Nietzsche, which is a Western form of Hatha Yoga, or Separatism. The individualism of Raja-Yoga, taught by Theosophy, is also by way of renunciation but by another method and with another object. " Tis from the bud of Renunciation of the Self, that springeth the sweet fruit of final Liberation," but the way of renunciation is not by Separateness, nor by isolation from the world. " Not by withholding from works does a man

reach freedom from works, nor through renunciation alone does he win Supreme Success,"* but by the desire for spiritual union with all mankind.

Here is the plain direction of Theosophical teaching, as it is clearly set forth in the Ancient Wisdom and repeated in other forms by all the great Teachers and adepts, including notably the Christ whose new commandment the churches have so pitiably failed to keep. Yet it may well seem at the present moment that the world is falling into a chaos of hate and insanity. And why, we must all be asking ourselves, have so few been able to find the golden key to the first of the Seven Portals, "Dana, the key of charity and love immortal"? Why are so few able to "bear love to men as though they were brother-pupils, disciples of one Teacher, the sons of one sweet mother"?

There can be but one answer to that question. The fault is in ourselves. We read great Truths such as those already cited in this article; we believe that they are words of wisdom; but we are unable to put them into practice in our own lives. We profess to be Theosophists, but have not taken one true step towards the attainment of its teaching. We concern ourselves with the problems of esoteric knowledge, seek to understand the mysteries, and forget the statement of that adept who said, "Though I understand all mysteries and all knowledge...and have not love, I am nothing."

So it is that the world trembles again on the verge of chaos, of war, hatred and insanity.

How then can we, earnest Theosophists, win this key of the first portal? How is it possible for us, average men and women, to acquire a selfless love of humanity, without distinction of race, creed or colour? Let us first observe ourselves and then see if we can interpret the direction of the Masters.

Now is it not true that there are very few who are capable of a deep and selfless love even for those who are dearest to us, husband, wife, son or daughter? When we are put to the test, we shall find an element of selfishness in our attitude towards them. We expect some return, and if we do not receive it, we are disappointed. Moreover, this kind of human affection nearly always contains an element of criticism, based on the standard of what we assume to be our own perfections. We desire to alter the objects of our affection in some respect or another, that they may be nearer this ideal of our heart's desire. We are not giving freely but with an ultimate purpose. We love in order to win some return. We are defending our own personalities.

Equally vain will be our efforts if we seek to love mankind as an exercise in self-discipline. If we go about the world with a determined smile, practising self-control, seeking to cure ourselves of the habit of criticism, endeavouring by a continual mental effort to find good in everyone we meet, generously (as it seems to us) trying to overlook

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, III, 4.

in others the faults that we cannot help observing, training ourselves to serve what is intrinsically a selfish purpose, we may make better citizens, we may even find a measure of happiness, but we shall never learn the true nature of love. Moreover we shall run the risk of suffering a dangerous reaction, since all self-discipline undertaken for purely intellectual reasons, is liable to provoke rebellion in the personality.* Also, this method, admirable as it may be in some respects, strengthens the natural tendency to objectify the personality, to build up a mental conception of the Self which is no more than an intellectual fantasy, a chimera that will not long survive physical death.† For those who have no hope of finding the golden key, self-discipline of this order may serve an excellent worldly purpose, but not by these means can we fit ourselves to pass the first gate.

But having thus observed ourselves and agreed that not by this or that way can we take our first step in the true path, whither shall we go for a direction? The Masters tell us that each of us must find a personal solution of his or her own problem, that in this matter there can be no golden rule, no magic formula, no dogma, by subscription to which we may walk in safety.

I am so deeply aware of these great difficulties that I must preface any attempt to cope with them, by the acknowledgment that I can give but one answer out of many. What follows must be accepted as a personal interpretation of the Ancient Wisdom, and there may well be other interpretations better fitted to those who have already taken their first step on the Path.

For me, then, and I speak more particularly to those who may happen to be in the same case, it seems that the preliminary phase which must precede all efforts after initiation must be by the realisation of what Heine called the "divine homesickness," that consciousness of urgency in the true self, which Francis Thompson described in "The Hound of Heaven" and is spoken of by Jesus as the "hunger and thirst after righteousness." If we hear that call of the inner voice and refuse to obey it, we shall sin against our own Spirit, and must suffer for the sin in lives to come.

Yet many who hear that call and seek to answer it, make little further progress. Very often they are tempted by it to separate themselves from their own kind, essay the difficult and sometimes dangerous experiment of unguided meditation and suffer the delusion of self-righteousness.‡ *Others* may fall into the same snare by believing that they are called upon to preach to others the truths they have not yet comprehended themselves. These are the temptations of the mind which must now be mistrusted as a guide, giving place to that Soul-Wisdom which alone has been

* "Kill out desire; but if thou killest it, take heed lest from the dead it should again arise." *The Voice of the Silence*, p. 15.

† Sakkayaditthi, the delusion of personality. See *The Voice of the Silence*, p. 4.

‡ See paragraph 2 of p. 4 in *The Voice of the Silence*.

responsible for our "divine homesickness."

And throughout the ancient teaching, cropping up continually here and there, we find that the advice given to the disciple in this, the very first stage on the road to peace, is to seek humility through obeisance. All our adult life has been guided by the "Head-Wisdom" we call Reason; and our first surrender must be by way of the realisation that Reason, as we know it, is founded on illusion.

We have to acknowledge our complete ignorance of the true wisdom, and learn that it can never arise from an intellectual source. Intellectual and spiritual pride will shut us out from the inner knowledge of what love is. For love necessitates a complete surrender of what we believe to be the personality, the false personality built up of pride in ourselves and critical judgments of others. There can be no true love even of those dearest to us, so long as we seek to change them in any degree. The disciple who wishes to take this very first step on the Path must remember always that he is a child in wisdom, the pupil and never the teacher.

We have to learn the lesson of humility by patient degrees, continually seeking within ourselves the seeds of that divine compassion from which the holy plant will presently spring.

And if we find it difficult to love thus, simply and wholly, those whom we most deeply admire, how much greater is the task when we seek to extend our compassion to mankind as a whole! We may, it is true, conceive that attitude as an imaginative possibility, but that, alone, is no more than a fantasy, another form of self-delusion. We have to put our imaginings into daily practice. Consider, for instance, deliberately and deeply, all that is implied by the following text from *The Voice of the Silence*:—

> Let each burning human tear drop on thy heart and there remain; nor ever brush it off, until the pain that caused it is removed.

How many of us can claim such abandonment of the self as is necessary to reach the deeps of pity and sympathy implied by that passage?

Truly this way of Raja-Yoga is the hardest of all paths to follow, harder far for those of great will and intellect than the way of asceticism and self-immolation, for we may not separate ourselves from the world. We have to serve the way of the spirit in daily contact with our fellows, by which means alone can we realise that all men are one.

J. D. BERESFORD

THE IDEAL SOCIAL ORDER

[**Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji**, famous for his researches into ancient Indian history, here examines, in the light of Hindu ideas, the famous book, *Looking Backward*, by Edward Bellamy.—EDS.]

Many and various definitions of the ideal social order have been put forward, most of them coloured by individual prepossession in favour of one or another scheme for bringing in the elusive millenium. Perhaps most modern thinkers would agree that the world is groping its way, slowly and painfully, towards a social order in which the individual and society will co-operate harmoniously to bring about unfoldment of the highest possibilities of each for the good of all. No modern social structure approximates to that ideal; most represent but sorry caricatures of it.

There are two approaches to the problem, the individual and what, for want of a better term, we may call the community approach. Eastern thinkers generally have favoured the former. The West, for all its insistence on individual freedom, its flouting of family and communal groupings and their attendant obligations, is coming more and more to favour the community approach to the problem of social and economic reconstruction.

An examination of the various schemes that have been projected from time to time for ideal societies, and especially of the scheme of the U.S.S.R. will show that, broadly speaking, they all rest upon a common structure of reasoning which may be presented in the form of a chain of propositions linked to one another thus :—

(1) Human Society must outgrow *poverty* as it seeks to outgrow economic and political slavery.

(2) Poverty is a product of *property*. Therefore individual property is inconsistent with the ideal social order.

(3) More injurious to human welfare than property is the train of consequences that follow from property. Property is the taproot of a vast poisonous growth choking civilization itself.

(4) Property is the sole cause of *crimes*. It makes a brute of man under dire necessity which knows no law.

"The gentlest creatures are fierce when they have young to provide for, and in that wolfish society the struggle for bread borrows a peculiar desperation from the tenderest sentiments. For the sake of those dependent on him, a man might not choose but must plunge into the foul fight—cheat, overreach, supplant, defraud, buy below worth and sell above, break down the business by which his neighbour feeds his young ones, tempt men to buy what they ought not and to sell what they should not, grind his labourers, sweat his debtors and cozen his creditors." In such a society, even angels would be degraded into devils.

(5) Lastly, property is inconsistent with *Religion* which consists in

Universal Love. Property means separation which is a negation of that love. It means *competition* which is completely antisocial and hence antireligious.

The remedy proposed is to organize society on a new foundation by guaranteeing both work and support to every individual and making every individual do his best for society by his work, which is compulsory like military conscription. This means that the State would be the sole employer of labour and assume conduct of all the mills, machinery, railroads, farms, mines and even the capital of the country. The State would also be the sole producer and distributor of commodities. A person's share of what he could get would depend upon what he had himself contributed by his own labour to the annual product of the nation. This contribution would be measured on the credit card issued to him. Such an economic regimentation would mean even the abolition of money economy and of saving by individuals.

Omitting such widely discussed experiments as Fascism, Communism and the Nazi régime, with their profound social implications, let us take as representative of the community approach a solution put forward as far back as 1887 in a book called *Looking Backward* by Edward Bellamy. It created a furor when it appeared. Nationalist clubs to further its ideals sprang up in the United States; within ten years about a million copies were sold there and in England; it was translated into many languages.

Some critics are unfair to Bellamy in thinking that his work lacks an ethical tone or a spiritual purpose and that it stands only for a better order for the material interests of life. On the contrary, it was really a spiritual purpose that drove Bellamy to conceive of his economic and social system as the best instrument for the self-fulfilment of the individual and the spiritual development of the race. The social structure he depicts would represent a long step towards the realization of universal brotherhood. The scheme of life described is not perfect because individuals are still selfish but by encouraging in them a feeling of solidarity and interdependence it reduces to a minimum the causes that tend to create and foster selfishness.

Bellamy's thesis is that private property creates walls of separation, material and moral, and so in his model society he leaves no place for private property or competition. All are guaranteed an equal share in the products of industry or the public income on the same grounds that men share equally in the free gifts of nature, like air to breathe and water to drink. We are not concerned here with the details of Bellamy's scheme, admirably as he has worked them out, though in passing we may point out a resemblance between his apportionment of occupations to various ages and the ancient Hindu division of the life of men into stages. Bellamy holds that the period of youth must be held sacred to education and the period of maturity with declining physical powers must be held equal-

ly sacred to leisure and relaxation. Studentship must end at twenty-one, when industrial service for the community begins, and ends after twenty-four years, that is at the age of forty-five, when citizens must retire from active duty. Bellamy here has been anticipated by some of the doctrines and practices of the Hindu social system technically called the *Varnasrama-Dharma* by which life is taken through a process of progressive self-realization in the four stages of the student, the householder, the mendicant, and the self-contained hermit renouncing everything in the quest of the Truth. The ideal is that no man should have any care for the morrow, either for himself or for his children, because the nation guarantees the nurture, education, and comfortable maintenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave. The question of difference of quality in the labour of workers is irrelevant to the system. What is required is that each must make the same effort and render the best service which he is capable of. All men who do their best, do the same. Diligence in national service is the sole and certain way to public repute, social distinction, and power of office.

Enough has been stated now to rouse fresh public interest in the new social order pictured by Bellamy, of which some of the most fundamental and typical features are already marking social evolution in different parts of the Western world. No thoughtful person can deny that environment plays its part, and an important part, in human betterment. The development of mind as well as body may be arrested by adverse economic and social conditions. It is not enough for individuals to hold right and true conceptions of ethical ideas and duties; these concepts have to be translated into such forms of daily life as shall be equitable and shall most fully satisfy the altruistic urge in man. But once a transformation in the individual is achieved, generosity and justice will be natural human expressions; the problem of an equitable social order will solve itself. Admittedly we cannot wait for the ultimate flowering of humanity in the mass. Conditions must be improved meanwhile, but we should recognize that expedients to which we have recourse are, at best, but temporary palliatives. No social structure *per se* can bring about the growth of the individual human soul.

From the Hindu point of view the system of Bellamy lays itself open to one fundamental criticism on the ground of principle. The system for which Bellamy stands is far too much organized and mechanized, so as to reduce individuals to the status of automatons for whom life consists only of serving the community. Every individual in Bellamy's state must cease to be an individual and must live only and exclusively for the state, merging his personality in the nation. In the Hindu view, it is the individual who forms the centre of the social system which exists, and claims his support, only as an instrument of the individual's self-fulfilment. Such a social system finds its justification

only in the degree in which it can extend or offer opportunities to individuals for that leisure, repose, and self-contained meditation in which the individual is left to himself to work out his own way towards God, by self-realization. Organization or mechanization may be very necessary in the ordering of man's material interests and mundane matters, but it is fatal to his spiritual growth. As Matthew Arnold puts it, "the aids to noble life are all within." A man's inner spiritual growth is his own individual and personal concern. It cannot be secured by something that is external. Even literary or artistic ability cannot come out of any machinery or organization, or any collectivist schemes of welfare. Spiritual growth is to be scrupulously treated as a personal, sacred and secret affair between the pupil and the teacher. It cannot be the subject of State regulation. It cannot be secured by statute of Parliament. It cannot prosper even in public institutions, not even in residential schools, colleges, or monasteries. It is a matter of life and growth, the product of individual treatment. The vital principle of that growth is that the individual must be left alone with his teacher and Creator to find his own personal way toward Him. Each individual must work out his own way of approach in his own way towards the Absolute.

The West is too much obsessed with ideas about the superior scope and efficacy of organization. These have their uses in certain spheres of life, but have no use in the sphere of individuals regarded as religious and spiritual Beings whose supreme duty is to unfold the Divine in them. For that, the individual must count more than the State which must directly contribute to his self-realization as an individual. Bellamy's State has no place for the saint or the seer. Its ideal is very well expressed in a passage in Mr. Barton's sermon: "For twofold is the return of man to God who is our home, the return of the individual by way of death, and the return of the race by way of evolution, when the divine secret hidden in the germ shall be perfectly unfolded." Bellamy is more anxious to plan for the progress of the race, not of the individuals composing it. He has no thought of the Infinite in the Finite, of the Absolute in the individual, of God in man. The Hindu system preserves a balance between the two ends of individual and social progress. It seeks to universalize the individual for the uplift of the race, as the Buddha has done for Humanity.

There is another reflection suggested by Hindu thought on this new social order. Ancient Hindu societies functioned under conditions which substantially reduced the scope and evils of property and competition. They functioned within small areas as self-governing village communities or rural republics in self-contained spheres of economic self-sufficiency and political and cultural independence. They controlled their economic interests, their production, distribution, trade and marketing, mainly in the interests of the community

through the village economic councils so as to give little scope to individual or middleman's profiteering. There is a rule on record that only luxuries could be exported, like spices, perfumes or precious stones, but not the necessaries of life, like food stuffs, which must be accumulated in the village granaries as insurance against famine. Money economy and its many undesirable consequences had to yield very largely to barter. These model societies had no idea of a world market, of speculation, of monopoly or cornering by combinations. They were based on Plain Living and High Thinking but they did not dispense altogether with private property, because it could not assume aggressive forms in such societies.

Private property was accepted as the basis of the home or a regulated domestic life which no degree of social progress can dispense with. Much of the home of the citizens of Bellamy's State is taken over by public institutions. India or Hinduism has, however, believed more in the privacy, the sanctity and the influence of the home for the bettering of individuals and society. It has believed in the cottage and the hermitage. It has believed more in villages than in cities. It has stood for rural in preference to urban civilization for the saving of the human soul from the clutches of materialism coming with the cities. India has believed more in the home or cottage industry than in the factory, more in the domestic school of the teacher than in any large educational institutions conducted by many teachers for many more pupils, whose education ceases to be individual and degenerates into a general process applicable to *classes* into which individual pupils are artificially grouped. India believes more in the personal human touch than in machinery. She has not set much store by standardized products of either industry or education. Artistic products have all to be handmade, while an individual's mental and moral growth must ultimately depend upon his intimate association with his teacher which alone can give him the insight into his inward methods, the secret of his creative faculties. An overcentralized and overmechanized social administration will tend to weed out all these vital elements of individual and social progress.

RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI

SHAKESPEARE'S DREAM

[**John Middleton Murry's** new book to be published early this year is *Shakespeare's Final Period*; it will represent the conclusion of a study of the great dramatist which has lasted over fifteen years. The following is a portion of a chapter of that book.—EDS.]

Because I am by temperament averse to reading Shakespeare as allegory I am struck by the fact that I cannot resist the conviction that *The Tempest* is more nearly symbolical than any of his plays. I find it impossible to deny that Prospero is, to some extent, an imaginative paradigm of Shakespeare himself in his function as poet; and that he does in part embody Shakespeare's self-awareness at the conclusion of his poetic career.

To this conviction I am forced by many considerations. The simplest and weightiest of them all is this: That there is a final period in Shakespeare's work which exists in reality and is as subtly homogeneous as a living thing, is to me indubitable. It is equally certain that *The Tempest* is, artistically, imaginatively and "sensationally," the culmination of that period. And, finally, it is certain that Prospero's function in the drama of *The Tempest* is altogether peculiar. He is its prime mover; he governs and directs it from the beginning to the end, he stands clean apart from all Shakespeare's characters in this, or any other, period of his work. He is the quintessence of a quintessence of a quintessence.

To what extent Prospero is Shakespeare, I do not seek to determine. I have no faith in allegorical interpretation, because I am certain that allegory was alien to Shakespeare's mind. I find no trace of it in the length and breadth of Shakespeare's work. When I reach the conclusion that Prospero is, in some sense, Shakespeare, I mean no more than that, being what he is, fulfilling his unique function in a Shakespeare play, and that in all probability Shakespeare's last, it was inevitable that Prospero should be, as it were, uniquely "shot with" Shakespeare. I mean no more than that it is remarkable and impressive that Shakespeare should have given his last play this particular form, which carried with it this particular necessity: which is no other than that of coming as near to projecting the last phase of his own creative imagination into the figure of a dramatic character as Shakespeare could do without shattering his own dramatic method. But in saying this, I do not mean that Shakespeare deliberately contrived *The Tempest* to this end. He wanted, simply, to write a play that would satisfy himself, by expressing something, or many things, that still were unexpressed. For this purpose, a Prospero was necessary.

He was necessary to make accident into design. *The Winter's*

Tale is a lovely story, but it is, in substance (though not in essence) a simple tale, a sequence of chances. There is no chance in *The Tempest*; everything is foreordained. Of course, this is appearance only. The events of *The Winter's Tale* are no less foreordained than those of *The Tempest*; both are foreordained by Shakespeare. But in *The Tempest*, Shakespeare employs a visible agent to do the work. That is the point. For it follows, first, that the visible agent of Shakespeare's poetic mind must be one endowed with supernatural powers, a "magician"; and second, that what he foreordains must be, in some quintessential way, human and humane. Once grant a character such powers, their use must satisfy us wholly. Chance may be responsible for the loss and saving of Perdita and the long severance of Hermione and Leontes, but not humane omnipotence.

It may be said that this is to put the cart before the horse, and that Shakespeare was concerned primarily with the solution of a "technical" problem. It may be that his central "idea" was the obliteration of the evil done and suffered by one generation through the love of the next, and that his problem was to represent that "idea" with the same perfection as he had in the past represented the tragedy of the evil done and suffered. (Though to call this a merely technical problem is fantastic: a whole religion is implicit in it.) In *The Winter's Tale* he had pretty completely humanised the crude story of *Pericles*: but Leontes's jealousy was extravagant, Antigonus' despatch a joke, the oracle clumsy, and Hermione the statue a theatrical trick. The machinery was unworthy of the theme. It stood in the way of the theme's significance.

We are driven back to the same conclusion. To precipitate the significance of the theme a palpable directing intelligence was required. What seemed accident must now be felt as design. There is but one accident in *The Tempest*, the accident which brings the ship to the island. And Shakespeare is emphatic that it is accident.

Mir. And now, I pray you, sir,
For still 'tis beating in my mind, your reason
For raising this sea-storm?
Pros. Know thus far forth,
By accident most strange, bountiful Fortune
Now my dear lady, hath mine enemies
Brought to this shore; and by my prescience
I find my zenith doth depend upon
A most auspicious star, whose influence
If now I court not, but omit, my fortunes
Will ever after droop.

Initial accident there must be. If Prospero's power extended to the world beyond the Island, so that he could compel the voyage thither, the drama would be gone. Prospero would be omnipotent indeed; and the presence of evil and wrong in the world he controlled would be evidence of devilishness in his nature. *The Tempest* implies a tremendous criticism of vulgar religion. I do not think that Shakespeare embarked on it deliberately; it was the spontaneous outcome of the working of his imagination. But I think there was a moment in the writing of his drama when he was deeply disturbed by the implications of the method to which he had been brought by the natural effort to-

wards complete utterance of his "sensation."

The Island is a realm where God is Good, where true Reason rules; it is what would be if Humanity—the best in man—controlled the life of man. And Prospero is a man in whom the best in man has won the victory: not without a struggle, of which we witness the reverberation.

Ari. Your charm so strongly works them
That if you now beheld them, your affections
Would become tender.
Pros. Dost thou think so, spirit?
Ari. Mine would, sir, were I human
Pros. And mine shall.
Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply,
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art?
Though with their high wrongs I am struck to the quick,
Yet with my nobler reason, 'gainst my fury
Do I take part: the rarer action is
In virtue than in vengeance: they being penitent
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend
Not a frown further. Go, release them, Ariel:
My charms I'll break, their senses I'll restore,
And they shall be themselves.

"Themselves"—not what they were, but what they should be. This is no stretch of interpretation. Gonzalo drives it home afterwards. "All of us found ourselves when no man was his own."

The Island is a realm, then, controlled by a man who has become himself, and has the desire, the will and the power to make other men themselves. Miranda is what she is because she has been his pupil.

Here
Have I, thy schoolmaster, made thee more profit
Than other princess' can that have more time
For vainer hours and tutors not so careful.

It is a difference between Miranda and Perdita; and an important one, for it belongs, as we shall see, to the essence of Shakespeare's thinking. It is not a difference in the imaginative substance of those lovely creatures. We must not say that Perdita is the child of nature, and Miranda the child of art. They are creatures of the same kind. The difference is only that in *The Tempest* Shakespeare wants to make clear what he means: *that men and women do not become their true selves by Nature merely, but by Nurture.* So it is that, for all his power, Prospero cannot transmute Caliban, for he is one

on whose nature
Nurture can never stick: on whom my pains
Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost.

The thought is vital to *The Tempest.* The Island is a realm where by Art or Nurture Prospero transforms man's Nature to true Human Nature. The process, in the case of the evildoers, must by dramatic necessity be sudden, and as it were magical; but we must understand its import. For this process is the meaning of Prospero.

We can approach Prospero by way of Gonzalo, who was, to the limit of his power, Prospero's loyal and understanding friend, in the evil past. Gonzalo has his own dream. After the shipwreck, he looks upon the beauty and richness of the enchanted island. "Had I plantation of this isle, my lord"—if it were his to colonise and rule—"what would I do?" And he answers; or rather Shakespeare answers for him. It is significant that Shakespeare takes his words from Montaigne. We have a choice: either the passage from Montaigne's essay "Of the Caniballes" was so familiar to Shakespeare that he knew it by heart, or he wrote Gonzalo's words with the passage from Florio's Montaigne before his eyes. Other solution

there is none. This is not reminiscence, but direct copying. I am sorry, says Montaigne, that the "cannibals" were not discovered long ago, when there were living men who could have appreciated their significance.

> I am sorie, *Lycurgus* and *Plato* had it not: They could not imagine a genuity so pure and simple, as we see it by experience; nor ever beleeve our societie might be maintained with so little art and humane combination.

The words are worth the scrutiny. We know that Shakespeare read and studied them while he was writing *The Tempest*. There are very few passages, outside North's *Plutarch*, of which we can certainly say so much: and assuredly no passage of the few we know that Shakespeare studied bears so nearly upon the heart of his final theme as this one.

Montaigne says that he regrets Plato and Lycurgus did not know of the "cannibals." Those great law-makers—one the legislator of an actual, the other of an ideal society—would have seen in the society of the South American savages something that exceeded "the conception and desire of philosophy." They could never have believed that a society of men might be maintained with so little art and humane combination—that is to say, with so little artifice and contrivance. Montaigne is saying that the life of the South American Indians proves that mankind is capable of living peacefully, happily and humanely without the constraint of law, or the institution of private property.

> It is a nation, would I answer Plato, that hath no kinde of traffike, no knowledge of Letters, no intelligence of numbers, no name of magistrate, nor of politike superioritie; no use of service, of riches or povertie; no contracts, no successions, no partitions, no occupation but idle; no respect of kindred, but common, no apparel but naturall, no manuring of lands, no use of wine, corne, or mettle. The very words that import lying, falsehood, treason, dissimulations, covetousnes, envie, detraction, and pardon, were never heard of amongst them. How dissonant would hee finde his imaginarie commonwealth from this perfection!

Gonzalo imagines that he has the empty island to colonise. What would I do? he says.

> I' the commonwealth I would by contraries
> Execute all things: for no kind of traffic
> Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
> Letters should not be known; riches, poverty
> And use of service, none; contract, succession,
> Bourne, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
> No use of metal, corn or wine, or oil;
> No occupation; all men idle, all;
> And women, too, but innocent and pure;
> No sovereignty.....
> All things in common nature should produce
> Without sweat or endeavour: treason, felony,
> Sword, pike, knife, gun, or need of any engine
> Would I not have; but nature should bring forth,
> Of its own kind, all foison, all abundance,
> To feed my innocent people.

What Shakespeare has done is singular, and revealing. Montaigne, true sceptic that he was, had pitted the savage against the civilised. Shakespeare omits from Montaigne's picture the incessant fighting, the plurality of wives, the cannibalism itself, and puts his words in Gonzalo's mouth as a description of the ideal; and at the same time he sets before us, in Caliban, his own imagination of the savage, in which brutality and beauty are astonishingly one nature. So Shakespeare makes clear his conviction that it is not by a return to the primitive that mankind must advance. Yet he

is as critical as Montaigne himself of the world of men. The wise Gonzalo, when he looks upon the "strange shapes" who bring in the unsubstantial banquet and "dance about it with gentle actions of salutation, inviting the king to eat," says:—

If in Naples
I should report this now, would they believe me?
If I should say, I saw such islanders—
For, certes, these are people of the island—
Who, though they are of monstrous shape, yet, note
Their manners are more gentle-kind than of
Our human generation you shall find
Many, nay almost any.

But these are not savages; they are Prospero's spirits.

This reaction to Montaigne, this subtle change of Montaigne, might be put down to a purely instinctive motion in Shakespeare, were it not for the fact that Shakespeare had used this essay of Montaigne before. He had been reading it at the time he was writing *The Winter's Tale*, for Polixenes's memorable defence of the Art which mends Nature, and is therefore itself Nature, is a reply to the passage in Montaigne's essay which immediately precedes those we have quoted. Montaigne begins by declaring that there is nothing in the Indians—head-hunting, cannibalism, incessant warfare, and community of wives, included—that is either barbarous or savage "unless men call that barbarism which is not common to them." He is, of course, turning it all to the account of his ethical scepticism: Truth this side of the Alps, falsehood the other. He goes on:—

They are even savage, as we call those fruits wilde, which nature of her selfe, and of her ordinarie progresse hath produced: whereas indeed they are those which our selves have altered by our artificiall devices, and diverted from their common order, we should rather terme savage. In those are the true and most profitable vertues, and naturall properties most lively and vigorous, which in these we have bastardized, applying them to the pleasure of our corrupted taste. And if notwithstanding, in divers fruits of those countries that were never tilled, we shall finde, that in respect of ours they are most excellent, and as delicate unto our taste; there is no reason, art should gaine the point of honour of our great and puissant mother Nature... Those nations therefore seem so barbarous to me because they have received very little fashion from humane wit, and yet are neere their originall naturalitie. The lawes of nature do yet commande them, which are but little bastardized by ours...

Precisely so, Perdita did exclude "carnations and streaked gillyvors" from her garden, because they are called "nature's bastards," because

There is an art which in their piedness shares
With great creating nature.

Shakespeare will have nothing to do with that false antithesis between Art and Nature. Says Polixenes: "Nature is made better by no mean but nature makes that mean." The Art that makes Nature better is Nature's art. That is the true distinction between Nature's art and man's, and it has perhaps never been more simply or subtly formulated. Where man's art improves nature, it is nature's art in man; where it makes nature worse, it is man's art alone. In *The Winter's Tale* we have first, Shakespeare's casual, in *The*

Tempest his deliberate, reply to the scepticism of Montaigne.

And thus it is that Shakespeare, in Gonzalo, with splendid irony, turns Montaigne's report of the Indians from mere nature, to a picture of nature's art in man, working on man. He discards the savagery, and retains only what belongs to the ideal and human. It is the innocence not of the primitive, but of the ultimate, which he seeks to embody. And that is manifest from the very structure of *The Tempest.* Caliban is the primitive; but Miranda and Ferdinand are the ultimate. There is no confusion possible between them, and the sophistry of Montaigne is exorcised by a wave of the wand. Nature and Nurture alone can make human Nature. But the nurture that is Nature's own is hard to find.

In *The Tempest* there is Prospero to govern the process, and to work the miracle of a new creation. Poised between Caliban, the creature of the baser elements—earth and water—and Ariel, the creature of the finer—fire and air—is the work of Prospero's alchemy: the loving humanity of Ferdinand and Miranda. Miranda is a new creature; but Ferdinand must be made new. He is made new by the spell of Ariel's music.

Sitting upon a bank.
Weeping again the king my father's wreck
This music crept by me upon the waters
Allaying both their fury and my passion
With its sweet air: thence have I follow'd it,
Or it hath drawn me rather. But 'tis gone.
No, it begins again.
ARIEL SINGS.
Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange
Sea-nymphs hourly ring his knell Ding-dong!
Hark, now I hear them—Ding-dong, bell.

From the ecstasy of that transforming music, Ferdinand awakes to behold Miranda, and Miranda beholds him *Jam nova progenies.*

Beneath a like transforming spell, eventually all the company pass—Alonzo, the false brother, Sebastian and Antonio, the traitors. In the men of sin it works madness, or what seems like madness, but is a desperation wrought by the dreadful echoing of the voice of conscience by the elements:—

Gon. In the name of something holy, sir, why stand you
In this strange stare?
Alen. O, it is monstrous, monstrous!
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it;
The winds did sing it to me, and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper; it did bass my trespass.
Therefore my son i' the ooze is bedded, and
I'll seek him deeper than e'er plummet sounded
And with him there lie mudded.
Seb. But one friend at a time!
I'll fight their legions o'er.
Ant. I'll be thy second.
Gon. All three of them are desperate: their great guilt
Like poison given to work a great time after
Now 'gins to bite the spirits.

That which Christian theology imposes on evil men at the Judgment Day—"The tortures of the damned"—by Prospero's art they experience in life. They are rapt out of time by his spells. To Gonzalo, whose life is clear, it brings only such change as that which Ariel's music works upon Ferdinand. But by these different paths, they reach the condition which Gonzalo describes: "All of us found ourselves when no man was his own."

So that when Miranda looks upon them, and cries for joy at

"the brave new world that has such creatures in it," they really are new creatures that she sees. They have suffered a sea-change. And Prospero's wise-sad words: "'Tis new to thee," if we were to take it precisely, applies only to the world beyond the island, not to those of its creatures he has transformed. But it is not the word of Prospero, it is of Prospero "shot by" Shakespeare, who knows it is not so easy to transform men, still less a world.

And it is a sudden pang of this awareness which underlies the strange conclusion of the lovely masque which Prospero sets before Ferdinand and Miranda, to celebrate their betrothal. He has promised to bestow on them "some vanity of mine art." It is the kind of lovely thing that Shakespeare found it natural to write: a vision of Nature's beauty, ministering to the natural beauty of Ferdinand's and Miranda's love. Ferdinand, enchanted, cries:—

Let me live here ever:
So rare a wonder'd father and a wife
Makes this place paradise.

Suddenly, towards the end of the concluding dance, Prospero remembers the clumsy plot of Caliban and Stephano against his life. He is in no danger, nor could he be conceived to be in danger. Yet he is profoundly disturbed, strangely disturbed, and the strangeness of the disturbance is strangely insisted on.

Fer. This is strange: your father's in some passion
That works him strongly.

Mir. Never till this day
Saw I him touched with anger so distempered.

Pros. You do look, my son, in a moved sort,
As if you were dismay'd; be cheerful, sir,
Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air;
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep. Sir, I am vex'd;
Bear with my weakness; my old brain is troubled:
Be not disturb'd with my infirmity:
If you be pleased, retire into my cell
And there repose: a turn or two, I'll walk
To still my beating mind.

Fer. Mir. We wish you peace.

It is not the plot against his life which has produced this disturbance. It is the thought of what the plot means: the Nature on which Nurture will never stick. The disturbance and the thought come from beyond the visible action of the drama itself.

What Prospero seems to be thinking concerning the vanity of his art, has been disturbed and magnified by what Shakespeare is thinking concerning the vanity of his. He has imagined a mankind redeemed, transformed, reborn; the jewel of the wood become the jewel of the world. As the recollection of Caliban's evil purpose seems to wake Prospero, so does the recollection of the world of reality wake Shakespeare; and these two awakings are mingled with one another. In *The Tempest* Shakespeare had embodied his final dream—of a world created anew, a new race of men and women. Was it also *only* a dream?

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A NOBLE CALL TO ACTION

[In this review **Hugh I'A. Fausset** examines the interpretation of the *Gita's* message by India's great political leader, the late B. G. Tilak, and finds it thought-provoking.—EDS.]

That the West should be increasingly attracted by the Wisdom of the East is one of the few encouraging signs of the times. But no less significant, perhaps, is the Gospel of Action which is beginning to be preached in the East itself. If this gospel were merely an echo of the creed of strenuous acquisitiveness, which the West has either to outgrow or perish, we might well despair of the human race. But it is of course nothing of the kind. The activistic ethics of the business man can never, it is safe to say, make any lasting appeal to the mind of the East, because that mind is essentially more mature than the Western and has, too, the support of an immemorial philosophy, in which crude individualism is so clearly put in its place. Yet, so long as the negative elements in that philosophy were unduly stressed and men were invited to renounce the world instead of helping to redeem it, the East was equally endangered by its own apathy and by the greed of Western powers. An inactive East could be Westernised from without, if not from within. But an East which had rediscovered its own true principle of action and set itself to live it could be neither exploited nor vulgarised. And it might well prove a model to the world.

This was the unwavering conviction of the late Lokamanya Tilak, the first volume of whose great commentary on the *Gita*, entitled *Gita-Rahasya or Karma-Yoga Shastra*, has just appeared in an English translation.* Tilak was not only a great scholar and a trenchant philosopher, but a Nationalist leader whose determination to reawaken both the political mind and the soul of the people, by linking its future to its past, has made his name and work a part of Indian history. Three times he paid with imprisonment for being a pioneer nation-builder, and it was during the last and longest period which he spent in gaol that he wrote the massive work which is now within the reach of English readers. It was originally written in Marathi and in this form has had a prodigious sale. Mr. Sukthankar has aimed above all at a faithful translation, even at the cost of perpetuating many long and involved sentences. The result is not easy reading, but neither, we can believe, is the original and despite occasional verbal infelicities

* *Śrimad Bhagavadgita Rahasya or Karma-Yoga-Sastra*, by *Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, B.A., LL. B. Translated by *Bhalchandra Sitaram Sukthankar*, M.A., LL. B., Vol. I. (Tilak Bros., Poona. Rs. 6/-)

such as "philanthropicalness" or "exuberation," he has done his task well.

That so difficult and weighty a book should yet have proved a best-seller in the original is perhaps surprising, until one begins to come under the spell of its author's character. Philosophical works generally appeal to the mind alone. They seldom transmit a moral force. But this book is not only a monumental commentary, based on encyclopædic learning and including in the sweep of its analysis whole systems of thought and of conduct, but it is a moral act. Babu Aurobindo Ghose has described Tilak as the very type and incarnation of the Maratha character, a rugged, strong and sturdy people, keenly intelligent and practical to the very marrow, following in ideas, even in poetry, philosophy, and religion, the drive towards life and action. And it is because we feel in this book from first page to last "a single-mindedness in aim of quite extraordinary force," an indomitable will and an unwavering devotion, that the weight and intricacy of its arguments do not tire us, nor the insistent repetition of its central theme, and that we rise up from the long labour of absorbing its six hundred pages morally braced and mentally enlightened.

The following passage from a speech by Tilak himself will best convey what the central theme of the book is.

> The conclusion I have come to is that the *Gita* advocates the performance of action in this world even after the actor has achieved the highest union with the Supreme Deity by Jnana (Knowledge) or Bhakti (Devotion). This action must be done to keep the world going by the right path of evolution which the Creator has destined the world to follow. In order that the action may not bind the actor, it must be done with the aim of helping His purpose, and without any attachment to the coming result. This I hold is a lesson of the *Gita*. Jnana–Yoga there is, yes. Bhakti-Yoga there is, yes. Who says not? But they are both subservient to the Karma-Yoga preached in the *Gita*.

And elsewhere he wrote:—

> Karma-Yoga does not look upon this world as nothing; it requires only that your motives should be untainted by selfish interest and passion. This is the true view of practical Vedanta, the key to which is apt to be lost in sophistry.

Such in brief is the cardinal doctrine which Tilak expounded in this book. And he claimed to do so as one who approached the *Gita* with no theory of his own for which he sought any support, contrasting himself in this with almost all previous commentators. Certainly he did all he could to guard against a prejudiced mind, if he did not always succeed in eliminating the bias of an intensely dynamic temperament. And even if he began his study of the *Gita* with a certain inevitable prepossession in favour of forthright Action, the discipline of objective research to which he submitted himself and which extended from the *Gita* itself over the whole field of Vedanta Philosophy with numerous side-references to the work of Western thinkers, left little room for personal prejudice. This volume displays the process and results of that exhaustive research, while the volume which is to follow will contain a translation of the *Gita*, stanza

by stanza, with more detailed commentaries where necessary.

Tilak's plan in this introductory but independent volume was to divide the chief subjects or doctrines met with in the *Gita*, into chapters and to expound each in turn with the most important logical arguments relating to them and by comparison with doctrines propounded in other religions and philosophies. How vast an undertaking this was may be suggested by citing such chapter headings as "The Science of Right Action," "The Materialistic Theory of Happiness," "The Intuitionist School and the Consideration of the Body and the Atman," "The Kapila-Sankya Philosophy," "The Construction and Destruction of the Cosmos," "The Philosophy of the Absolute Self," "Karma and Freedom of Will," "The State of the Perfect and Worldly Affairs," "The Path of Devotion." But such bare titles can give little idea of the wealth of cogent critical analysis, or philosophical knowledge and homely illustration, which underlies them. Each chapter is, indeed, almost a system of philosophy in itself and the arguments in favour of a given philosophy, whether it be Comte's Positivism, Kapila's Dualism or Haeckel's materialistic nondualism, are stated with the same thoroughness as the arguments against. Yet there is no casuistical balancing of one school of thought against another. Tilak's aim throughout was to recover and vindicate the pure Vedic truth which in his view had become overlaid and distorted through the ages by one-sided interpretations. All his extensive analysis was subordinated to this aim and when, as in the monumental chapter on "The Philosophy of the Absolute Self," he was free to explore the loftiest ranges of that truth, his relentless powers of logic reached upwards to the pure realm of creative reason. No review, however, could do justice to the detailed comprehensiveness of this book as a critical survey of some of the most sublime and subtle reasoning which the human mind has put forth upon the nature of being and the problems of conduct. I can at best in the space left to me define rather more precisely the central truth which this masterly survey was intended to enforce.

In the history of Indian thought and religion as traced by Tilak and illustrated in a pictorial map of its prominent schools from the Vedic Age to the present day, two main paths have been prescribed for all who would obtain release from the bondage of ignorance and egoism, the paths of Desireless Action and of Renunciation by Abandonment of Action. Tilak has sought to prove that the former path by which a harmony is established between the realisation of the highest self and action was not only the more ancient, but the more true to the creative demands of life. The ages of Buddha and of Sankara, in which an exclusive emphasis was laid upon release through enlightened abandonment of action and to a less degree the age of Jnaneshvara, Tukarama and others who exclusively concentrated upon devotion, represented, in his view, a falling

away from the integral truth of "the energistic Vedic religion" into a negative one-sidedness. While fully admitting that he who renounced the world and realised the Atman attained Release, he firmly rejected Sankara's claim that knowledge and action were mutually antagonistic, like light and darkness, or that, Release once attained, a man owed no further duties to the world. The *Gita,* which he described as embodying the basic principles of the Hindu Religion and Morality, upheld, he insisted, no such antagonism. While showing that there is an opposition between Knowledge and Desire-prompted Action,—it admits none between Knowledge and Desireless Action. It asks you, therefore, "to perform all Actions desirelessly, and never to give them up." This is the imperative upon which the whole book turns and which is hammered home perhaps rather too insistently. Tilak was so single-minded in his conviction that he tended in places to oversimplify the problem and so much of a fighter at heart that it is hard to imagine his ever being unduly troubled by the doubts and scruples of Arjuna. Yet he had so truly achieved that renunciation of self which is the true renunciation that he could enter into all the dilemmas which an ethic of action entails, and if he failed at times to solve them quite satisfactorily, as in his treatment of the problem of resistance or nonresistance to evil, he never failed to state the problem disinterestedly.

That life in this manifested world is action and demands unceasing action of us all, in one form or another, he has proved with a weight of indisputable authority, and likewise that true action is a kind of inaction, because it is done in us and through us by the Creator. And it is only in the working out of this truth that we feel at times the limitations of a nature so sturdily averse to "self-centred weaklings" and "spineless arguments." In particular his view of what constituted necessary action in the world strikes us as having been rather restricted by his own intensely positive and practical bent. It is arguable, for example, that a solitary in the forest, devoting his life to prayer for the world or to radiating enlightenment to its more sensitive minds, is acting more potently than any hard-working statesman or champion of social reform. And while Tilak considered action in relation to the different castes, he hardly made sufficient allowance perhaps for those higher spiritual activities in which action may even have the appearance of inaction. The *Gita-Rahasya* itself, for instance, executed in the silence and retirement of a prison, was the fruit of an enforced abandonment of the world. But it may well ultimately prove to have been the most potent act of his life.

While, however, it is possible to find in this great act and exposition of Karma-Yoga certain defects of emphasis, these count for little against the solid integrity of its interpretation of Vedic truth. "It takes," in Aurobindo Ghose's words, "the Scripture which is perhaps the strongest and most comprehensive production of Indian Spirituality

and justifies to that Spirituality by its own authoritative ancient message the sense of the importance of life, of action, of human existence, of man's labour for mankind which is indispensable to the idealism of the modern spirit."

And if it calls the East to express its immemorial wisdom and devotion in creative action, its message to the modern West is no less important. For it shows with a strenuous logic which will appeal to the Western Spirit that only the action of a desireless mind and a devoted heart can bring release to the individual and harmony to a discordant world.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

HEREDITY

SOME OLD HINDU POINTS OF VIEW

[Two recent publications on heredity from the modern science angle are reviewed here by two thoughtful Indians both of whom adduce suggestive ancient teachings to show the incompleteness of the Western approach.

Mr. Viswanatha is right as far as he goes in stating the position of Madame Blavatsky on the rationale of heredity, but a further quotation may make it clearer. It is " the spiritual potency in the physical cell " that she declares guides the development of the embryo and causes the hereditary transmission of faculties and all the qualities inherent in man. " The Darwinian theory, however, of the transmission of acquired faculties, is neither taught nor accepted in Occultism. Evolution, in it, proceeds on quite other lines ; the physical, according to esoteric teaching, evolving gradually from the spiritual, mental, and psychic. This inner soul of the physical cell—this ' spiritual plasm ' that dominates the germinal plasm—is the key that must open one day the gates of the terra incognita of the Biologist, now called the dark mystery of Embryology." (*The Secret Doctrine* I. 219).—EDS.]

This little book* provides a popular epitome of recent research in genetics, on the origin, evolution and ascent of man.

The production, generation after generation, of offspring identical in all but minor peculiarities with their parents is indeed one of the chief miracles of life. Mendel's remarkable discovery of the gene has made it possible for the scientist to consider evolution in terms of measurable units. This unit is the genetical species which can be determined experimentally by an analysis of the gene and the chromosome complex. (p. 103) All the complicated life of our higher animals and plants of to-day is due to the balance maintained by the precise mechanism of chromosomes. (pp. 39, 50) With our present knowledge of the genes and their intimate and invariable association with life, it is clearly evident that they were concerned directly with the first origin of life. (p. 35)

The first chapter gives a beautiful summary of what in Hindu philosophy is comprehended in the *aṇoraṇiya*—the bacteriophages, viruses, bacteria and cocci, one-celled plants and animals, fungi etc. of modern science. Through the long ages evolution gradually advanced, building up more and more complex forms until to-day its greatest culmination is man with his mind which is *mahato mahīya*. The author gives (p. 115 ff.) a very useful summary of the biological discoveries of the present century in the order of their appearance. His observations on the scientific possibil-

* *Heredity and the Ascent of Man*. By C. C. HURST, Ph. D., Sc. D. (Cambridge University Press, London, 3*s*. 6*d*.)

ity of Virgin Births (84 ff.) are of especial interest; and the recorded experiments on the fruit fly (78 ff.) are of profound importance in connection with the nature of the offspring resulting from crossing.

This eminently readable book on a difficult subject, written by an accepted authority on genetics, and intended to establish the fundamental unity of matter, life and mind, "constituting a monistic trinity with a common basis in origin in pure thought, which after all may be only another name for the spirit" (p. 136), must indeed be welcome as adding to the sum total of human knowledge so far attained.

The doctrine of evolution is propounded in Hindu sacred texts. Recognition of the desirability of eugenics is implicit in the *Bhagavad-Gita*: "When virtue wanes in the family, women become corrupt; and this leads to a confusion of castes and clans." As a discussion would be out of place here, I would simply invite attention to the bearing of the illustration on p. 20 of this book on the principle underlying the Hindu classification of marriages into *Anuloma* (along the grain) and *Pratiloma* (against the grain).

Heredity determines no doubt the physical features and the intellectual equipment of the individual; but science has so far offered no explanation of the soul. The doctrine of reincarnation is a necessary complement to the scientific scheme of evolution which takes no account of the self-conscious intelligence of the human soul.

As stated by Madame Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine*, twelve years before Mendel's experiments were brought to light and appreciated, the two chief difficulties of the science of embryology, namely, the formation and growth of the fœtus and the hereditary transmission of likeness, have never been properly answered; and she declared they would never be solved till the day when scientists condescend to accept the occult theories. (S. D. I. 223)

> The German Embryologist-philosopher (Weissmann) shows—thus stepping over the heads of the Greek Hippocrates and Aristotle, right back into the teachings of the old Aryans—one infinitesimal cell, out of millions of others at work in the formation of an organism, determining alone and unaided, by means of constant segmentation and multiplication, the correct image of the future man (or animal) in its physical, mental and psychic characteristics. It is that cell which impresses on the face and form of the new individual the features of the parent or of some distant ancestor; it is that cell again which transmits to him the intellectual and mental idiosyncrasies of his sires and so on. This Plasm is the immortal portion of our bodies—simply through the process of successive assimilations. (S. D. I. 223)
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> Complete the physical plasm, . . . the "Germinal Cell" of man with all its material potentialities, with the "spiritual plasm," so to say, or the fluid that contains the five lower principles of the six-principled Dhyan—and you have the secret, if you are spiritual enough to understand it. (S. D. I. 224)

S. V. VISWANATHA

This book by the Editor of *The Eugenics Review** gives a comprehensive picture of the results so far available regarding the facts of heredity with some indication of the social implications of the problem. It refrains from positive suggestions for reconstruction.

A comparative survey of current and ancient Indian speculations on the problem of heredity reveals differences characteristic of the two orientations on a background of similarity. The same essential questions are asked but differences in answer are dictated by the wider and more synthetic point of view of ancient Indian thinkers. The ancient view holds all the relevant factors in a just harmony—physical, physiological, psychological and spiritual. This is clear, for example, in the very statement of the problem. The book under review, in harmony with the spirit of Modern Science, gives a detailed account of the processes of fusion of the male and female elements strictly from the mechanical point of view. To such an attitude, mind and spirit can only appear as unintelligible surds to be explained away if possi-

* *Heredity, Mainly Human*. By ELDON MOORE (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 15*s*.)

ble. Behaviorism is the characteristic result.

In Indian works, on the other hand, like the *Charaka Samhita*, a standard medical treatise, the conclusion is not prejudiced by the very orientation. The constitutive factors are analyzed into five: (1) the paternal and (2) the maternal elements, fusing to form the seed; (3) the food and drink assimilated by the mother and nourishing the offspring in the womb; (4) the further transformation of food into secretions (hormones?); and (5) the soul. The organism is a vehicle of the soul, to which it is but the most intimate part of the external environment. It holds in concentrated form, ready to develop, an infinite number of potencies in mid-career. No impassable gulf is recognized between the physical and higher levels. *Charaka Samhita* (Śarīrasthāna) gives a list of the derivatives from these five constituent factors. The characteristics of the fertilized ovum derived from the father are said to be hair, nails teeth, bones, nerves and semen. The maternal elements are declared to be skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, lungs, the breasts, intestines, stomach, entrails and the marrow. The food assimilated by the mother contributes health, activity, the quality of the appetite, happy functioning of the senses, voice, complexion, blood, semen, and temperament. From the essences of the *rasas* of the mother's body during pregnancy and gestation are obtained birth of the body, its growth, union with the vital spirits, nourishment and activity.

So much for the biological factors—but the Indian view goes on to add the contribution of the soul. The soul is not *born* but only enters the body so constituted in accordance with the law of Karma or universal causation. The body is the net result of commerce with the environment in previous incarnations. There is a preëstablished harmony between the bodily endowment at the moment of inception and the state of development of the soul, however mysterious may be the process of their mutual gravitation. But the defects of body and mind brought on *after conception* by accidents to the mother's body are not to be regarded as inherited by previous *karma*. We must distinguish strictly between heredity and environment. The soul brings with it a *manas* or psyche carried over from previous incarnations. This psyche is the summation of the following: the quality of earnestness, external conduct, purity, aversion, memory, heedlessness, power of renunciation, envy, courage, energy, wrath, fear, procrastination, promptness, keenness etc.—in a word, the mental endowment as a whole, which is a psychical aspect of heredity. The mind in the Indian sense is only an instrument of the soul at a higher level exactly as the senses are at a lower level.

Whatever may be the logical process by which these results were obtained by ancient thinkers, they furnish a more fruitful and less misleading starting point for investigation. They do not weight the issue on the side of materialism. They neglect no aspect of the problem. An attempt to verify them by means of superior instruments of modern research is sure to suggest fertile hypotheses. (For example, diseases affecting these parts of the body may be traced through heredity.)

It should not be thought that the hereditary transmission of these elements of the psycho-physical organism is simple and direct. If it were so, Bharadwaj asks: "Why then do not the offspring of idiots, of the blind, the hunchbacked, of those who speak with a nasal twang, of the insane etc., resemble their parents?" The answer of Atri's son consists of a distinction which seems to anticipate modern theories of germ-plasm and of Mendelism. "Verily in the seed from which the body springs (germ-plasm) there are particular portions from which limbs grow. When a particular portion of the seed therefore is damaged, the limb that would have grown out of it becomes deformed. . . . . Hence the children born of idiots and the rest do not necessarily resemble their parents." Certain elements of the seed are predisposed to stimulate their growth in the

offspring. No character of the parent bodies affects the issue unless it is deep enough to affect the seed.*

Another part of the answer takes an analytical view of the endowments inherited. The inheritance of the individual is regarded as a mixture of many potentialities derived from all the ancestors in different proportions—in fact it is said to go back to Brahma, the Demiurge! This is the essence of Mendelism that heredity functions in unit characters assorted differently in accordance with a formula. Both the theories of palingenesis and of epigenesis are canvassed by different schools of thought.

The addition of the factor of the soul implies that the soul inherits its own past† registered in the psycho-physical organism. Destiny means the outcome of the deeds of previous incarnations. This is one of the decisive differences between Indian and Western science. The *Charaka Samhita* points out that some kinds of mental inheritance enable the possessor to recollect the incidents of previous lives (*jatismara*). Another difference is due to the great attention paid in Indian thought to the intimate relation between the soul and the body. In accordance with the Guna hypothesis, bodies are classified from the standpoint of their fitness to contribute to spiritual functioning. The physical resultant at the end of life is passed on to the *manas* which enters the next body suitable to it. The yoga psychology makes full use of the intimate relation between body and soul in its scheme of self-realization.

It is from the standpoint of heredity that Indian thought places a greater responsibility on women. The *Bhagavad-Gita* refers to the danger of race confusion (*varna sankara*) and destruction of family tradition through the corruption of women. There is a statement often made in Indian scientific writings‡ that sex relations with more than three men damage the woman's body and her offspring born thereafter beyond recovery. This should open up a new line of investigation of great importance for eugenics. Modern theories of eugenics do not seem to take account of such differences of hereditary transmission through the sexes. It has interesting sidelights on the problem of divorce. Biologically two divorces may be permissible and not more!

Indian thought is rich in considered judgments on constructive eugenics. For example, the Code of Manu not only lays down prohibitions of interracial (probably interdevelopmental) marriages with which we are familiar, but also gives a clue towards gradual regeneration. The offspring of Brahmana and Shudra parents may by continuous marriage into a higher order regain the Brahmana endowment in seven generations!** In such a process both physical and cultural heredity function in co-operation towards racial regeneration.

Further, throughout Indian medical treatises recurs the idea that complexion is largely a matter of food. Colour of skin in Indian thought has very little to do with race. It is mostly a matter of Guna and Karma, psycho-physical endowment and spiritual level. All peoples have members of all races in this view, which should have refreshing repercussions on the current confusion between race and colour.

Another outstanding difference between the two cultures is the large place given to the psychological values of food. This problem is entirely overlooked

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* यस्य यस्य ही अङ्गावयवस्य बीजे बीजभाव उपतप्तो भवति तस्य तस्य अङ्गावयवस्य विकृतिः उपजायते. (*Charaka-Śarīrasthāna*)

† दैवे पुरुषकारे च कर्मसिद्धिर्व्यवस्थिता। तत्र दैवमभिव्यक्तं पौरुषं पौर्वदेहिकम्॥ (Yajnyavalkya)

‡ तृतीये पुरुषे अनुरक्तासि तत्त्वं बन्धकी जाता (Kathasaritsagara)

** शूद्रायां ब्राह्मणाज्जातः श्रेयसा चेत्प्रजायते। अश्रेयान् श्रेयसीं जातिं गच्छत्यासप्तमा युगात्॥ ६४॥ (*Manu.* 10, 64)

in the current experiments on animals in connection with the nutritive values of various diets.

The book under review describes clearly and illuminatingly the mechanism of heredity in nontechnical language but is very meagre on the larger social and spiritual implications of the problem of heredity.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

THE FUTILITY OF RATIONALIZING

The question which Mr. Collis's forthright and challenging book* really asks is this :—

Is man free to govern the world ?

That is a question which ultimately involves philosophic and metaphysical definitions of the words " free " and " govern " ; but it is nevertheless an exceedingly practical question at the moment. We are rapidly becoming conscious of the world as a social unit. Can man regulate and maintain the order of this unit according to principles of human government ; or is he himself so governed by his environment that all he can do is to obey its laws ? Is he a product of evolution involuntarily obeying ruthless laws of necessitous Nature, or can he order his life according to human principles ? Is he, in short, the passive sufferer or the actor of life ?

Of course he is both. Philosophy begins with the recognition that he is both ; but thereafter philosophies are static or dynamic, realist or idealist according to their inclination toward the point at which man is regarded either as the complete slave of circumstance or an entity existing in complete independence of it. Whether we are living statically or dynamically depends upon our inclination in one direction or the other. And ultimately that is decided by the value we give to consciousness.

Natural evolution represents law apart from consciousness : if man lives solely according to this, he lives according to the law of fate which governs the animal world. So doing he may revert to the beast or be swept out of existence ; but the law will continue to operate. On the other hand, law according to consciousness is law of an order superimposed upon natural evolution : it is law according to principle, and consciousness is the giver and arbiter of principle. *The question for every man to-day is whether he has enough faith in the principles dictated by consciousness to live by them and to exert his influence in persuading other men to live and abide by them ; or whether he regards himself and all men as products of environment compelled to obey a natural law which overrides consciousness. Will he live by faith or by fate ?*

Mr. Collis's plea is for faith. Apart from the direction of faith and its constant exercise in creating order out of disorder, the world can only become a disgusting muddle. Realize, he says ; then act in the faith of that realization. Stop arguing—stop thinking if you can only think contentiously. Open your eyes ; and above all, open your heart, and so discover that what is often called knowledge is only rationalization, while consciousness is realization. Rationalization is the knowledge of death : realization is the experience of life. The fact that the author of this book understands this difference perfectly clearly makes his book a valuable contribution to the munitions now being forged in the fight for life.

The central chapter is entitled " The Birth of Intuition as a Science. " It is full of good things (that is perhaps the final criticism of the book) ; but such a title is a confused expression of thought. It shows, I think, that Mr. Collis's reach exceeds his grasp, and more than once in a praiseworthy effort at compression and clarity he achieves contradiction where he intends synthesis. Birth is one idea, intuition is another, science is a third, and essentially these ideas are unrelated. What I think Mr. Collis wishes to

* *Farewell to Argument*, by J. S Collis. (Cassell, London. *7s. 6d.*)

convey is the idea that intuition may be propagated, and that this intuition, which is commonly regarded as a vague inclination of mind, is, if truly born, a determinant power of knowledge, and as such can be subjected without fear to scientific analysis. But I am not sure, and I believe the fault rests with Mr. Collis. For in his desire to be comprehensive he sometimes seems to me to be stirring oil and water with more vigour than discretion, as if hoping by forthright energy to dissolve inherent differences. Thus he appears to identify intuition with imagination. After showing most admirably with what simplicity the soul may awake from the sleep of death, he says: "A new faculty has grown up inside the earthly envelope. Call it imagination, or love, or intuition, or Reason in her most exalted mood." To which I respond: Call it nothing of the sort; for if you call the faculty of perception by such extensive names, you do not achieve definition but only vague generalisation, and a very precise event in life is merged in terminology descriptive of different faculties more or less incident to life in general. That love cannot be identified with imagination is perhaps the world's tragedy. That intuition is different from imagination a child can teach us. And as for "Reason in her most exalted mood," Wordsworth should surely beg our pardons for such a phrase, since it is of the essence of reason that it should not be subject to moods, whether exalted or depressed.

But if Mr. Collis cannot always say exactly what he means it is for the very good reason that his thought is apprehensive and not dully and academically and limitedly rational. He is not a literary mathematician bent primarily upon showing us how skilfully he can manipulate the fixed quantities of thought. He is rather one of those to whom William Blake addressed himself in the preface to "Milton" where he warned the young man of his age against the intellectual snobbery and sterility of that kind of learning which is used as a defence against thought and a buttress of decaying tradition. He knows the difference between mere intellectual activity and the enlargement of consciousness, and his chief aim is to sweep aside the mass of verbal badinage which passes for thought among our academically trained intelligentsia, and insist that only what proceeds from experienced consciousness is worthy of the name of thought. Thus his highly argumentative book is yet true to its title. Let us, he says in effect, consider realizations instead of meddling any longer with intellectual propositions. His method is to summon the pluck of a determined Irishman and put the thermometer of realized experience into the mouths of a dozen or more of our modern leaders of thought.

Could there be a more disputatious method? For Mr. Collis is of course his own thermometer. Few will agree with all his estimates; but his odd divining method merits a retrospective regard when we find that by it we have gained a distinct sense of increased significance in some of the figures examined. Thus, though he is far from giving the whole truth about Gandhi, his criticism tells and becomes valid for a whole continent. His appreciation of D. H. Lawrence, by virtue of its directness and simplicity, touches the core of Lawrence's true significance. And that is no small achievement. That he is able to see Havelock Ellis as towering head and shoulders above his contemporaries is perhaps as much due to Mr. Collis's posture as to Mr. Ellis's eminence; for the most eminent critic and humane scientist hardly deserves the meed due only to creative artists, even though he has kept a noble balance in an age of scientific fanaticism. However, personal estimates are only secondary to Mr. Collis's real purpose, which is to show that religious experience always awaits him who really desires it, that religious truth is as true to-day as ever it was, that science is the handmaid of religion to those who know the difference between consciousness and deductive inference, that art is revelation of eternal truth.

MAX PLOWMAN

Maimonides: A Biography. By SOLOMON ZEITLIN, Ph. D. (Bloch Publishing Co., New York. $ 2)

The Guide for the Perplexed. By MOSES MAIMONIDES. Translated from the Original Arabic Text by M. FRIEDLANDER, Ph. D. Second Revised Edition. (E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York.)

Whether or not it is necessary to endorse completely the claim that " from Moses (Maimonides) there arose none like Moses " (p. 182)—for similar claims have been made on behalf of almost all the system builders and world teachers—there can be no doubt that Dr. Zeitlin, making the fullest use of new material which was not available to earlier biographers has succeeded in giving an attractive account of the life, doings, and teachings of one who has been mainly responsible for the systematic development of Jewish thought, its philosophy, theology, and religion. The multiple aspects of the magnetic personality of Maimonides, who was physician as well as metaphysician, lawyer and leader, saint and statesman, are vividly portrayed by the biographer.

Whatever the vicissitudes of his career, Maimonides will be permanently remembered as the author of *The Guide for the Perplexed*, in which he has elaborately set forth his views on theology and philosophy. Written for the benefit of a pupil of his, who may be taken as typical of those who, as the result of thinking, have come into conflict with religion, and who feel bewildered by the figurative language employed in holy writ, the *Guide* is not merely a treatise on Biblical interpretation and exegetics, but a philosophical justification of God's ways to man.

I shall focus attention on his solution of the problem of evil, a formidable rock on which almost all systems of thought have been shipwrecked. According to Maimonides, " All evils are negations." From this he concludes that God *cannot* be the author of negation or nonexistence. " He creates evil only in so far as He produces the corporeal element such as it actually is . . . connected with negatives and source of . . . all evil." (p. 266) The classification of evil into three kinds powerfully reminds one of the Sankhyan compartmentalization of pain into " Adhyatmika," "Adhi-daivika," and " Adhi-bhautika." The Vedantic solution of the problem is simple, whether or not it is convincing to critics. Creation is considered *beginningless in time* (Anadi) and evil is causally connected with actions by individuals themselves as the result of exercise of their free and unfettered volition. Karma punishes the wicked and rewards the virtuous. Otherwise faith in the ultimate triumph of righteousness will be lost. It is not clear why Theistic systems fight shy of considering God as the author of evil. Reading through the pages of the *Guide* one is powerfully impressed with the inward struggle in the mind of Maimonides between requirements of rational philosophising and loyalty to biblical interpretation. Otherwise Maimonides's rejection of the Aristotelian doctrine of an eternal universe, on the plea that the proof adduced by Aristotle is not satisfactory, is unintelligible since Maimonides himself offers but a popular demonstration of evil being merely negation. There seems to be no philosophic reassurance in the thought that " No evil comes down from above," as it is very obvious that the floodgates can be thrown open for evil to rush up from below—the regions of Satan.

Metaphysical consistency and finishing touches apart, students of the " Vedanta" will recognize that they are in perfect agreement with Maimonides's account of the worship of God practised by the Perfect. I shall give only one citation: " When you are alone by yourself, when you are awake on your couch, be careful to meditate in such precious moments on nothing but intellectual worship of God." (*Guide*, p. 387). What Maimonides speaks of is the devotional contemplation of the Lord (Nididhyasana) at every moment of existence, even when the subject is carrying out the routine of daily life and conduct. Ready and willing service to one's fellow men advocated by Maimonides finds striking concrete exemplification in his own life for his

biographer points out, citing his letter to Samuel ibn Tibbon, (p. 176) that Maimonides had not even time to take rest as he had to examine a huge multitude and write down prescriptions for Jews and Gentiles, judges and bailiffs, friends and foes.

I shall close with only one more observation. Maimonides was not a Monist. He was not an Advaiti. He does not imagine any merger of finite personality into the Absolute as the goal of existence. He refers to four kinds of perfection, which man can attain (*Guide*, p. 395), and emphasizes that the most exalted is possession of ideas "which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God." This is the *Brahma-Jnyana* of the Vedanta.

Maimonides wrote in the twelfth century his *Guide for the Perplexed*. Mankind has now advanced to the twentieth. It has progressed. The atom is about to be split or has been split. Wars and gas bombs are plentifully in evidence. There are thundering cries of economic sanctions against aggressors. The moral and the metaphysical millennium is still receding like the horizon. Mankind, the thinking section of it, is still perplexed. The unthinking section is arrogant and power-intoxicated. Why do people sin? queried Arjuna long ago. The Lord answered, sin is due to Desire, to anger engendered by Rajoguna. (काम एष : क्रोध एषः रजोगुणसमुद्भवः।) Centuries ago, Maimonides gave mankind a guide. If contemporary conditions of civilised communities are a correct index, ungrateful mankind appears to have repudiated the guide. Mankind is still patently perplexed. Will a Maimonides appear anywhere in contemporary society? If he did what welcome would he receive?

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Book of Ram, The Bible of India. By MAHATMA TULSIDAS. Rendered into English by HARI PRASAD SHASTRI (Luzac & Co., London.)

A high British authority has observed that "there is probably no book in existence which gives such a complete and vivid picture of what the average Hindu, at his best, believes, as the *Ramayan* of Tulsidas." The work was composed, we learn, in the sixteenth century, and was itself a condensed version of the immense *Ramayana*. The present small book is a further condensation.

The whole of it is permeated by that mood of complete devotion (as, for example, of a pupil toward his teacher) which is conspicuous in such Indian literature. It also relates many marvels of a kind familiar in fairy stories and in the dream state. Both the mood and the narrative are so foreign to a Western mind that the book is unlikely to have much value for those who have been brought up in a Western civilisation.

CLIFFORD BAX

Philosophy of the Good Life. By CHARLES GORE (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. Everyman Series, 2*s*. net.)

This series of lectures, (Gifford Lectures) their author states, purports to show by a survey of the world's great religions that only in Christianity may a basis for the way of the "Good Life" be found. This claim and such statements as: "Neither in the religion nor in the philosophy of India is any stable foundation to be found for ethics"; Zarathustra "was neither a mystic nor a metaphysician, and his theological idea lacked precision"; the doctrine of the Great Buddha is "abhorrent"; can evoke but a smile from even an unsectarian tyro who is engaged in a study of comparative religions; he is able to see the fundamental truth and

beauty hidden deep within the core of *all* the great religions when shorn of their dogmatic garbs of prejudice and superstition, yes, even of Christianity.

This volume does a distinct disservice to everyman for whom it is meant; it misleads him about the grandeur and the lofty idealism of philosophy and ethics of ancient religious systems; it will not occur to him that much that is useful in these lectures is mixed up with the reflections of a mind no doubt learned but narrow and vitiated by theology and sectarianism.

M. JAMES

The Art of Happiness. By JOHN COWPER POWYS (The Bodley Head, London. 6s.)

This volume illustrates with remarkable clearness, one might almost say crudity, how little the East and West have pooled their spiritual resources, learnt what can be learnt from those who have gone before, and having recognised certain established facts, gone forward together to make further conquests in the art of life. Instead of that, the usual thing is to find philosophers, leaders, intellectual lights, publicists of all sorts starting right back at the beginning again, discovering the same problems to be overcome, and seemingly quite unaware that much of the ground has been carefully covered before, thought out, and in many cases conquered by prescribed methods. Mr. Powys provides a good example of the man who advances to the fringe of known, mapped-out territory as if he were a lonely sojourner courageously and brilliantly hacking his way through terrible jungles hitherto untrodden by the foot of man. Take the following:—

> And it is not as if we were really relaxing, as people call it, or resting our exhausted energies, when we make no attempt to stop the dung-beetle larvae, the flying ashes from the everlasting dust-cart, these prickly burrs, these fumes from the prison house, these meaningless midges of memory, to find harbourage in a mind that has taken millions of galaxies of burning constellations, millions of miracles of chance and fatality to call into being.....

It will be guessed that Mr. Powys is referring to the haphazard thoughts that parade through our minds and muddy the clear water of our vision and the calm execution of our deeds. The problem is as old as the ages, and we in the West should be prepared to admit that the East alone has made the only scientific attempt to meet it. The system of Yoga is so elaborate, so exhaustive, so colossally scientific and definite that one would think that such an edifice could hardly be overlooked even by Mr. John Cowper Powys, the semi-mystic, the semi-thinker, the semi-stylist, the semi-Lawrencian, the semi-artist. But it is overlooked. And this in itself is significant. For is not Mr. Powys right in his attitude after all? In representing the average Westerner he must needs start at the beginning again and pretend that the whole thing is new; he must hack out salvation in terms of the West; he must connive at the deep-seated belief in the West that the Eastern solution to our everyday problems is in terms of denial, of asceticism, of refusal to enjoy life, of turning away from this world which is the world of all of us, where we find our happiness or not at all. Such a view of the East has little foundation and suggests an image very far from the truth—to the real Eastern mystic there is nothing negative about Nirvana, it is "bliss unspeakable." Nevertheless, Mr. Powys, in embracing the mighty and noble conception of Heraclitus that life is a battle, always a battle of Everlasting Opposites, and that we must fight that battle in order to live abundantly; in stressing that therefore War is by no means necessary since any man in any job has all the scope he needs "for rising to spiritual heights of sublime intensity"; in urging us to use our senses to the utmost, even to force them "to respond to the magic of the elements"; in advising us to accept the adventure of marriage and the battle of the sexes in the same affirmatively intellectual spirit—he does represent the mind of the West. And while represent-

ing that mind and writing so as to be accepted by it he has advanced many ideas and suggested practices which may be called a sort of elementary Yoga, so that his book, more than a learned treatise, really conducts the West, ungently and unfirmly, towards the wisdom of the East.

J. S. COLLIS

The Doctrine of the Ṣūfīs. (*Kitāb-al-Ta'arruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf*) Translated from the Arabic of ABŪ BAKR AL-KALĀBADHI by A. J. ARBERRY (Cambridge University Press, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This book is a translation from the Arabic of an early Ṣūfī text, of which the translator published an edition last year. The writer of this treatise, Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī, who died in A. D. 995, was probably a native of Bukhara.

The book is valuable because of its early date and the information which it gives concerning the Ṣūfī teachers whose names and writings were known to the author, and for its discussion of their doctrines as taught in his time. To him, the Ṣūfīs are the saints, chosen by God to be His ambassadors and the recipients of His revelation, whose pre-ëminence above the rest of mankind has been made clear.

Of their teaching on the nature of God, "the Ancient Who has never ceased, the Abiding Who will never pass away," Kalābādhī says that they hold Him to be "Foremost before all things born in time, Existent before everything—He is neither body nor shape nor form nor person, nor element nor accident—He is not contained by space, nor affected by time," One who can be best described by what He is not, of Whom It can only be asserted that "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward," Nothing in one sense, All Things in another.

The spirit of man, these early Ṣūfīs taught, was divine and uncreated, being indeed one in nature with the Creator. Salvation for man lies in the attainment of the knowledge of God, that Gnosis which, in full measure, is reserved for his saints, and the Path towards this goal is, therefore, one of purification, leading the mystic onward by way of repentance, abstinence, patience, poverty, humility, complete trust in God, and satisfaction with His will, until at last the seeker becomes one with the Sought and the human enters into union with the Divine. "Union" writes Kalābādhī, "implies being inwardly separated from all but God, seeing inwardly none but God and listening to none but God," of which one of the Ṣūfī poets wrote (p. 118):—

In union divine
With Him, Him only do I see
I dwell alone, and that felicity
No more is mine.

This mystic union
From self hath separated me:
Now witness concentration's mystery
Of two made one.

This book, though interesting and important, is not so full or so systematic an account of Ṣūfism as the *Risāla* of Qushayrī, in Arabic, or the *Kashf al-Mahjūb* of Hujwīrī, in Persian. The translator, admittedly, has aimed at a literal version, and this has resulted, at times, in a somewhat uninspired rendering of the author's meaning. Kalābādhī has included a number of Ṣūfī poems, which have been translated into English verse. One of the most attractive of these is a description, given by a woman mystic of Syria, of the single-minded lovers of God.

Their every purpose is with God united,
Their high ambitions mount to Him alone:
Their troth is to the Lord and Master plighted—
O noble quest, for the Eternal One!

They do not quarrel over this world's pleasure—
Honours, and children, rich and costly gowns,
All greed and appetite! They do not treasure
The life of ease and joy that dwells in towns.

Facing the far and faint horizon yonder
They seek the Infinite, with purpose strong
They ever tread where desert runnels wander,
And high on towering mountain-tops throng!"

The book has been beautifully produced by the Cambridge Press, and has an adequate index.

MARGARET SMITH

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

Gandhiji is providing excellent opportunity to young Indians to experience the adventures of life healthily, to serve their country in a very constructive way and to mould their characters, attuning themselves to a spiritual rhythm. Incidentally the great leader is tackling the problem of unemployment and is showing how practice of right philanthropy and earning of right livelihood go hand in hand. Week by week in the columns of *Harijan* the reader comes upon ideas and suggestions for the improvement of the Indian villages based on actual experience—and it is well to bear in mind that there are 700,000 of them. Young men in overcrowded cities look for employment, and the number of those who roam the streets is known to be very large. For them a new profession is being created, that of the village servant-leader. Young men are desired to earn their living in the village, and combine the task of getting from and giving to the village whatever is possible. University graduates may find it a little more difficult to adapt themselves to that life than those who have not had that advantage; but in the ranks of the former prevail, perhaps to a greater extent, enthusiasm for serving the poor and the country and the capacity to enjoy a life of sacrifice. In any case, what is required for this new profession is a village mentality. Writes Gandhiji in *Harijan* for the 23rd of November:

> No doubt, if a person goes to a village with the city mentality and wants to live in villages the city life, he will never earn enough unless he, like the city people, exploits the villagers. But if a person settles in a village and tries to live like the villagers, he should have no difficulty making a living "by the sweat of his brow."

Several lines of labour are suggested, and young men are free to choose and learn whatever work they can easily do, including the conducting of—

> an honest shop where unadulterated food-stuffs and other things can be had for the cost price and a moderate commission. It is true that a shop, be it ever so small, requires some capital. But a worker who is at all known in the area of his work should command sufficient confidence in his honesty to enable him to make small wholesale purchases on credit.

Important and interesting as the economic aspect of this programme is, its moral aspect is still more valuable. The young men are not to abandon family life but to seek the partnership of their wives in the spiritual adventure of becoming "a pattern of virtue and work" and of providing the "best object-lesson" by giving "some time to cleaning the village," rendering such simple medical assistance as is within their power to give and living as villagers do and not as "a patron seated among them to be

adored from a respectful distance." Further, the young couple should provide for their children an "all-round education under the parental roof," for "there is no school equal to a decent home and no teachers equal to honest, virtuous parents."

The home as a school for soul-growth for themselves and their children—this is restoring the old ideal suited to modern conditions. Through this effort a new race of householders—Grihastas—and of tradesmen—Vaishyas—will come to birth. The one thing necessary is adequate knowledge of the first principles of Soul Science, without which Right Living is not only difficult but perilous.

The principles underlying this noble effort can be made applicable outside of India.

Prof. J. B. S. Haldane, F. R. S., has contributed a striking article, "In Defence of Materialism," to *The Rationalist Annual* 1936, in which he maintains that "the tendency of science to-day is definitely towards materialism, though not towards the unduly mechanistic materialism of some nineteenth-century thinkers." Only a minority of physicists, he explains, have abandoned materialism, and the majority "are beginning to attribute to matter properties sufficiently complicated to make a materialistic account of life and mind very much more plausible than seemed likely a few years ago."

Such materialism as Professor Haldane anticipates is in line with the theories of the Svabhâvikas, a school of Buddhist philosophers who maintain "that there is no Creator, but an infinitude of creative powers, which collectively form the one eternal substance, the essence of which is inscrutable." It is definitely preferable to irrational religious theories which take their defenders in the direction of sacerdotalism.

A letter written half a century ago by an Oriental Sage makes the position clear:—

> When we speak of our One Life we also say that it penetrates, nay is the essence of every atom of matter; and that therefore it not only has correspondence with matter but has all its properties likewise, etc.—hence *is* material, is *matter itself*. . . .
>
> In other words we believe in MATTER alone, in matter as visible nature and matter in its invisibility as the invisible omnipresent omnipotent Proteus with its unceasing motion which is its life, and which nature draws from herself since she is the great whole outside of which nothing can exist. For as Bellinger truly asserts "motion is a manner of existence that flows necessarily out of the essence of matter; that matter moves by its own peculiar energies; that its motion is due to the force which is inherent in itself; that the variety of motion and the phenomena that result proceed from the diversity of the properties of the qualities and of the combinations which are originally found in the primitive matter" of which nature is the assemblage and of which your science knows less than one of our Tibetan Yak-drivers of Kant's metaphysics.

Professor Haldane and his compeers have drawn appreciably nearer since then to the position of the Oriental philosophers. But they have still a very long way to go!

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CONTENTS FOR DECEMBER 1935

Æ

Æ AND THEOSOPHY—*By P. G. Bowen*

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TRUTH AND FREEDOM IN RELIGION: CREEDAL CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIBERAL CHURCHES—*By Leslie J. Belton*

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THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS—*By A. E. Waite*

ENDS & SAYINGS

INDEX TO VOLUME VI

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